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Abstract—The beyond worst-case threshold problem (BWC),
recently introduced by Bruye`re et al., asks given a quantitative
game graph for the synthesis of a strategy that i) enforces some
minimal level of performance against any adversary, and ii)
achieves a good expectation against a stochastic model of the
adversary. They solved the BWC problem for finite-memory
strategies and unidimensional mean-payoff objectives and they
showed membership of the problem in NP∩coNP. They also
noted that infinite-memory strategies are more powerful than
finite-memory ones, but the respective threshold problem was
left open.
We extend these results in several directions. First, we consider
multidimensional mean-payoff objectives. Second, we study both
finite-memory and infinite-memory strategies. We show that the
multidimensional BWC problem is coNP-complete in both cases.
Third, in the special case when the worst-case objective is unidi-
mensional (but the expectation objective is still multidimensional)
we show that the complexity decreases to NP∩coNP. This solves
the infinite-memory threshold problem left open by Bruye`re et
al., and this complexity cannot be improved without improving
the currently known complexity of classical mean-payoff games.
Finally, we introduce a natural relaxation of the BWC problem,
the beyond almost-sure threshold problem (BAS), which asks for
the synthesis of a strategy that ensures some minimal level
of performance with probability one and a good expectation
against the stochastic model of the adversary. We show that the
multidimensional BAS threshold problem is solvable in P.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a two-player mean-payoff game played on a weighted
graph [1], [2], given a threshold v ∈ Q, we must decide if there
exists a strategy for Player 1 (the controller) to force plays
with mean-payoff values larger than v, against any strategy of
Player 2 (the environment). In the beyond worst-case threshold
problem (BWC), recently introduced by Bruye`re et al. in [3],
we are additionally given a stochastic model for the nominal,
i.e. expected, behaviour of Player 2. Then we are asked, given
two threshold values µ, ν ∈ Q, to decide if there exists a
strategy for Player 1 that forces (i) plays with a mean-payoff
value larger than µ against any strategy of Player 2, and (ii) an
expected mean-payoff value larger than ν when Player 2 plays
according to the stochastic model of his nominal behaviour. In
the BWC problem, we thus need to solve simultaneously a two
player zero-sum game for the worst-case and an optimization
problem where the adversary has been replaced by a stochastic
model of his behaviour.
BWC is a natural problem: in practice, we want to build
systems that ensure good performances when the environ-
ment exhibits his nominal behaviour, and at the same time,
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that ensure some minimal performances no matter how the
environment behaves. In [3], the BWC problem is solved
for finite-memory strategies and unidimensional mean-payoff
objectives, and shown to be in NP∩coNP. Also, it is noted
there that infinite-memory strategies are more powerful than
finite-memory ones, and that cannot even be approximated by
the latter (already in the unidimensional case; cf. [4, Fig. 6]
for an example). The respective threshold problem was left
unsolved. We extend here these results in several directions.
A. Contributions
Our contributions are as follows. First, we consider d-
dimensional mean-payoff objectives. Multiple dimensions are
useful to model systems with multiple objectives that are
potentially conflicting, and to analyze the possible trade-offs.
For example, we may want to synthesize strategies that ensure
a good QoS while keeping the energy consumption as low as
possible. This extends the BWC problem with one additional
level of conflicting trade-offs, which makes the analysis sub-
stantially harder. Second, we study both finite-memory and
infinite-memory strategies. We show that the multidimensional
BWC problem is coNP-complete in both cases, and so not
more expensive than the plain multidimensional mean-payoff
games. This is obtained as a coNP reduction to the solu-
tion of a linear system of inequalities of polynomial size.
Correctness follows from non-trivial approximations results
for finite/infinite-memory strategies inside end-components1.
While in the unidimensional case optimal values for the
expectation can always be achieved precisely (already by mem-
oryless strategies), in our multidimensional setting this is not
true anymore. To overcome this difficulty, we are able to show
that achievable vectors can be approximated with arbitrary
precision, which is sufficient for our analysis. Third, in the
special case when the worst-case objective is unidimensional
(but the expectation is still multidimensional), we show that the
complexity decreases to NP∩coNP. This solves with optimal
complexity the infinite-memory threshold problem left open
in [3]. Finally, we introduce the beyond almost-sure threshold
problem (BAS) which is a natural relaxation of the BWC
problem. The BAS problem asks, given two threshold values
~µ, ~ν ∈ Qd, for the synthesis of a strategy for Player 1 that (i)
ensures a mean-payoff larger than ~µ almost surely, i.e. with
probability one, and (ii) an expectation larger than ~ν against
the nominal behaviour of the environment. This problem has
1Sub-MDPs which are strongly connected and closed w.r.t. the stochastic
transitions.
2been independently considered (among other generalizations
thereof) in [5]. We show that the multidimensional BAS
threshold problem is solvable in P. As in the BWC problem,
we reduce to a linear system of inequalities of polynomial size,
but this time the reduction can be done in P.
B. Related works
Solutions to the expected unidimensional mean-payoff prob-
lem in Markov Decision Processes (MDP) can be found for
example in [6], it can be solved in P, and pure memoryless
strategies are sufficient to play optimally. The threshold prob-
lem for unidimensional mean-payoff games was first studied
in [2], pure memoryless optimal strategies exist for both
players, and the associated decision problem can be solved
in NP∩coNP. As said above, BWC was introduced in [3] but
studied only for finite memory strategies and unidimensional
payoffs, the decision problem can be solve in NP∩coNP.
Multidimensional mean-payoff games are investigated in [7],
[8], where it is shown that infinite-memory controllers are
more powerful than finite-memory ones, and the finite-memory
and general threshold problems are both coNP-complete. The
expectation problem for multidimensional mean-payoff MDPs
is in P, and finite-memory controllers always suffice [9].
Moreover, a recent study showed that one can add additional
quantitative probability requirements for the mean-payoff to
be above a certain threshold (while still optimizing the expec-
tation), and that the resulting decision problem is P for the so-
called joint interpretation (where the probability threshold is
the same for all dimensions), and exponential for the conjunc-
tion interpretation (each dimension has a different probability
threshold) [5] (cf. also [10]). In both cases, infinite-memory
strategies are required to achieve the desired performance.
Here, we study the multidimensional mean-payoff BWC thresh-
old problem, for both finite-memory and arbitrary controllers.
Our BWC threshold problem generalizes both the synthesis
problem for multidimensional mean-payoff games and for
multidimensional mean-payoff MDPs with no additional cost
in worst-case computational complexity.
C. Illustrating example
Consider the following task system [11]: There are two
configurations (0 and 1), and at each interaction between the
controller and its environment, one new instance of two kind of
tasks can be generated (0 and 1). The two tasks are generated
with equal probability 1/2 in the nominal behavior of the
environment. Before serving pending task k ∈ {0, 1}, the
system may decide to go from configuration i to configuration
j at cost aij , for i, j ∈ {0, 1}, and then it has to serve the
pending task k from the new configuration j at cost bjk. Thus,
the total cost is aij + bjk. Costs are bidimensional: Each cost
specifies an amount of time and energy; the actual parameters
are shown in Fig. 1a. For example, from configuration 0,
task 0 takes 30 time units to complete and it consumes 2
energy units, while from the other configuration the same task
takes 2 time units and 10 energy units. We are interested in
synthesizing controllers that optimize the expected/worst-case
mean (i.e., per task) time and energy. There are trade-offs
between the two measures: If the controller decides to serve
a task quickly then the system consumes a large amount of
energy, and vice versa. To analyze this example, we rephrase it
as the multidimensional mean-payoff MDP depicted in Fig. 1b.
For example, state 0 represents the fact that the system is in
configuration 0 waiting for a task to arrive, while in state (0, 0)
a task of the first type has arrived, and the controller needs
to decide whether to serve it from the same configuration, or
go to configuration 1. The objective of the controller is to
guarantee worst-case mean time 24 under all circumstances,
in that case the probabilities in the MDP are ignored and the
probabilistic choice is replaced by an adversarial choice (we
have thus a two-player zero sum game). Additionally, with
the same strategy for the controller, we want to minimize the
expected mean energy consumption in the nominal behaviour
of the controller given by the stochastic model. If the controller
decides to always serve tasks from configuration 0, then it
ensures an expected mean energy consumption of 3, but under
this strategy, the worst-case mean time is 60, which does
not meet our worst-case objective of 24. A strategy for the
controller that is good both for the worst-case and for the
expectation can be obtained as follows: For two parameters
α, β ∈ N, stay in configuration 0 for α consecutive tasks, then
move to configuration 1 for β tasks, and then repeat. This
ensures worst-case time α−1α+β 60+
1
α+β64+
β−1
α+β 8+
1
α+β 16 and
expected energy α−1α+β (
1
22+
1
24)+
1
α+β (
1
24+
1
26)+
β−1
α+β (
1
210+
1
220) +
1
α+β (
1
216 +
1
226). By taking α = 1 and β = 3, we
obtain worst-case time 24 (thus meeting the requirement) and
expected energy 14. Note the trade-off: To ensure a stronger
guarantee on the mean time, we had to sacrifice the expected
mean energy.
In this paper we address the problem of deciding the
existence of controllers ensuring a worst-case (or almost-
sure) threshold, while, at the same time, achieving a usually
better expectation threshold under the nominal behavior of the
environment. We consider the class of multidimensional mean-
payoff objectives.
D. Structure of the paper
In Sec. II, we present the preliminaries that are necessary to
define the BWC and BAS problems. In Sec. III, we solve the
BWC problem both for finite and infinite memory strategies.
In Sec. IV, we solve the BAS problem and show that finite
memory strategies are sufficient to achieve the BAS threshold
problem. Finally, in Sec.V we conclude with some final
remarks. Full proofs can be found in the appendices A and
B.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let N, Q, and R be the set of natural, rational, and real
numbers, respectively, and let R±∞ = R ∪ {+∞,−∞}. For
two vectors ~µ and ~ν of the same dimension and a comparison
operator∼∈ {≤, <,>,≥}, we write ~µ ∼ ~ν for the component-
wise application of ∼. In particular, ~µ > ~0 means that every
component of ~µ is strictly positive. A probability distribution
on A is a function R : A → Q≥0 s.t.
∑
a∈AR(a) = 1. The
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(b) Example of multidimensional mean-payoff MDP.
Fig. 1: Illustrating example.
support of R is Supp(R) = {a ∈ A | R(a) > 0}. Let D(A)
be the set of probability distributions on A.
A. Weighted graphs
A multi-weighted graph is a tuple G = (d, S,E,w), where
d ≥ 1 is the dimension, S is a finite set of states, E ⊆ S × S
is the set of directed edges, and w : E → Zd is a function
assigning to each edge a weight vector. When d = 1, we refer
to G just as a weighted graph. With ~x[i] we denote the i-
th component of a vector ~x. For a state s ∈ S, let E(s) =
{t | (s, t) ∈ E} be its set of successors. We assume that each
state s has at least one successor. LetW be the largest absolute
value of a weight appearing in the graph.
A play in G is an infinite sequence of states π = s0s1 · · ·
s.t. (si, si+1) ∈ E for every i ≥ 0. Let Ωωs0(G) be the set
of plays in G starting at s0, and let Ω
ω(G) be the set of all
plays of G. When G is clear from the context, we omit it.
The prefix of length n of a play π = s0s1 · · · is the finite
sequence π(n) = s0s1 · · · sn−1. For a set of states T ⊆ S,
Let Ω∗(G, T ) be the set of prefixes of plays in G ending in a
state sn−1 ∈ T .
The total payoff and mean payoff up to length n of a play
π = s0s1 · · · (or prefix of length at least n) are defined
as TPn(π) =
∑n−1
i=0 w(si, si+1) and MPn(π) =
1
nTPn(π),
respectively. The (lim-inf) total and mean payoffs on an infinite
play π are then defined as TP(π) := lim infn→∞ TPn(π) and
MP(π) := lim infn→∞MPn(π).
B. Markov decision processes
A Markov decision process, or MDP, is a tuple G =
(G,SC , SR, R), where G = (d, S,E,w) is a multi-weighted
graph, {SC , SR} is a partition of S into states belonging
to either the Controller player or to the Random player,
respectively, and R : SR → D(S) is a function assigning
a distribution over S to states belonging to Random s.t., for
every s ∈ SR, Supp(R(s)) = E(s). We do not allow R(s) to
assign probability zero to any successor of s.2 Let Q be the
largest denominator used to represent probabilities in R. We
use Q as a measure of complexity for representing R.
In order to discuss the complexity of strategies for Con-
troller, we represent them as stochastic Moore machines. A
strategy for a MDP G = (G,SC , SR, R) is a tuple f =
(M,α, fu, fo), consisting of a set of memory states M , the
initial memory distribution α ∈ D(M), the stochastic memory
update function fu : S ×M → D(M), and the stochastic out-
put function fo : S
C ×M → D(S), where Supp(fo(s,m)) ⊆
E(s) for every s ∈ SC andm ∈M . The update function is ex-
tended to sequences f∗u : S
∗ → D(M) inductively as f∗u(ε) =
α and f∗u(πs)(m
′) =
∑
m∈M f
∗
u(π)(m)fu(s,m)(m
′). The
output function on sequences f∗o : S
∗SC → D(S) is
defined as f∗o (πs)(s
′) =
∑
m∈M f
∗
u(π)(m)fo(s,m)(s
′). A
play π = s0s1 · · · is consistent with a Controller’s strategy
f if, and only if, for every i s.t. si ∈ SC , we have si+1 ∈
Supp(f∗o (s0s1 · · · si)). Given a state s0 and a Controller’s
strategy f , the set of outcomes Ωfs0(G) is the set of plays
starting at s0 which are consistent with f .
A strategy f is pure iff Supp(fu(s,m)) and Supp(fo(s,m))
are both singletons. A strategy f is memoryless iff |M | = 1,
finite-memory iff |M | <∞, and infinite-memory iff |M | =∞.
Let ∆(G), ∆P(G), ∆F(G), and ∆PF(G) be the sets of all, resp.,
pure, finite-memory, and pure finite-memory strategies.
C. Markov chains
A Markov chain is an MDP where no state belongs to
Controller, i.e., SC = ∅, and in this case we just write
G = (G,R). An event is a measurable set of plays A ⊆ Ωω(G).
Given a state s0 and an event A ⊆ Ωωs0(G), let P
G
s0 [A] be the
probability that a play starting in s0 belongs to A, which exists
and it is unique by Carathe´odory’s extension theorem [12]. An
even is almost sure if it has probability 1. For a measurable
2This restriction will simplify the presentation. It is not present in [3], but
it can be easily lifted.
4payoff function v : Ωω(G)→ Rd±∞, let E
G
s0 [v] be the expected
value of v of a play starting in s0.
A Markov chain G is unichain if it contains exactly one
bottom strongly connected component (BSCC). Therefore, if
G is unichain, then all states in its unique BSCC are visited
infinitely often almost surely, and the mean payoff equals its
expected value almost surely.
Given a MDP G = (G,SC , SR, R) and a strat-
egy f for Controller represented as the stochastic Moore
machine (M,α, fu, fo), let the induced Markov chain
be G[f ] = (G′, R′), where G′ = (d, S ×M,w′, E′)
with ((s,m), (s′,m′)) ∈ E′ iff (s, s′) ∈ E, m′ ∈
Supp(fu(s,m)), and s
′ ∈ Supp(fo(s,m)) whenever s ∈ SC ,
w′((s,m), (s′,m′)) = w(s, s′) for every ((s,m), (s′,m′)) ∈
E′, R′(s,m)(s′,m′) = R(s)(s′) · fu(s,m)(m′) for every
s ∈ SR, and R′(s,m)(s′,m′) = fo(s,m)(s
′) · fu(s,m)(m
′)
for every s ∈ SC . Note that G[f ] is finite iff f is finite-
memory. By a slight abuse of terminology, we say that a
strategy f is unichain if G[f ] is unichain. Plays in G[f ] can
be mapped to plays in G by a projection operator proj(·) :
Ωω(G′) → Ωω(G) which discards the memory of f . Given
a state s0, a Controller’s strategy f , and an event A ⊆ Ωωs0 ,
let PGs0,f [A] := P
G[f ]
s0
[
proj−1(A)
]
. For a measurable payoff
function v : Ωω(G)→ Rd±∞, let E
G
s0,f
[v] := E
G[f ]
s0 [v
′], where
v′(π) := v(proj(π)).
D. End-components
A end-component (EC) of a MDP G is a set of states
U ⊆ S s.t. a) the induced sub-graph (U,E ∩ U × U) is
strongly-connected, and b) for any stochastic state s ∈ U∩SR,
E(s) ⊆ U . Thus, Controller can surely keep the game inside
an EC, and almost surely visits all states therein. For an end-
component U of G, we denote by G ⇂ U the MDP obtained
by restricting G to U in the natural way. ECs are central in
the analysis of MDPs thanks to the following result.
Proposition 1 (cf. [13]). For any Controller’s strategy f ∈
∆(G), the set of states visited infinitely often when playing
according to f is almost surely an EC.
E. Expected-value objective
For a MDP G, a starting state s0, and Controller’s strategy
f ∈ ∆(G), the set of expected-value achievable solutions
for f is ExpSol+G (s0, f) = {~ν ∈ R
d | EGs0,f [MP] > ~ν}, i.e.,
it is the set of vectors ~ν s.t. Controller can guarantee an
expected mean payoff > ~ν from state s0 by playing f . The
set of expected-value achievable solutions is ExpSol+G (s0) =⋃
f∈∆(G) ExpSol
+
G (s0, f). Given a state s0 and rational thresh-
old vector ~ν ∈ Qd, the expected-value threshold problem asks
whether ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0).
Theorem 1 ([9]). The expected-value threshold problem for
multidimensional mean-payoff MDPs is in P.
While randomized finite-memory strategies are both necessary
and sufficient in general for achieving a given expected mean
payoff, in ECs we can use randomized finite-memory unichain
strategies to approximate achievable vectors. Being unichain
s t
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
(0, 0)
(a) A MDP reduced to one EC.
s, 0s, 1 t
1
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1
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(b) Exact strategy inducing two BSCCs.
s, 1 s, 2 · · · s,A
t, 1t, 2· · ·t, A
(0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1)
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(1, 0)(1, 0)(1, 0)
(0, 0)
(c) Approximate finite-memory strategy inducing one BSCC.
Fig. 2: Approximating the expectation inside ECs.
ensures that the mean payoff equals the expectation almost
surely. By standard convergence results in Markov chains, this
entails that by playing such a strategy for sufficiently long time
we obtain an average mean payoff close to the expectation
with high probability. We crucially use this property in the
constructions leading to the main results of Sec. III and IV;
cf. Lemmas 3, 5, and 8.
Example 1. We illustrate the idea in the single end-component
MDP in Fig. 2a (cf. [8, Fig. 3]). There exists a simple
randomized 2-memory strategy f achieving expected mean
payoff precisely (12 ,
1
2 ) which decides, with equal probability,
whether to stay forever in s or in t. However, the induced
Markov chain has two BSCCs; cf. Fig. 2b. While intuitively no
pure finite-memory strategy can achieve mean payoff exactly
equal (12 ,
1
2 ) in this example, finite-memory unichain strategies
can approximate this value. For a parameter A ∈ N, consider
the strategy gA which stays in s for A steps, and then
goes to t, stays in t for A steps, and then goes back to s,
and repeats this scheme forever. The induced Markov chain
has only one BSCC, thus gA is unichain; cf. Fig. 2c. The
strategy gA achieves expected (and worst-case) mean payoff(
A
2A+2 ,
A
2A+2
)
, which converges from below to (12 ,
1
2 ) as
A→∞.
Lemma 1. Let G be a multidimensional mean-payoff MDP, let
s0 be a state in an EC U thereof, and let ~ν ∈ ExpSol
+
G⇂U (s0)
be an expectation vector achievable by remaining inside U .
There exists a finite-memory unichain strategy g ∈ ∆F(G)
achieving the same expectation ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G⇂U (s0, g).
5Remark 1. In the lemma above, we can take g to be even
a pure finite-memory unichain strategy. This can be obtained
by a de-randomization technique at the cost of introducing
extra memory of size exponential in the number of the states
controlled by the player. However, we do not need this stronger
result in the rest of the paper, and we content ourselves with
randomized strategies for simplicity.
Proof sketch. By the results of [9], there exists a randomized
finite-memory strategy f achieving expected mean payoff
~ν∗ > ~ν which surely stays inside U . However, (G ⇂ U)[f ]
is not unichain in general. By Proposition 1, the set of states
visited infinitely often by a play in (G ⇂ U)[f ] is an EC almost
surely. Since there are finitely many different ECs, there are
probabilities α1, . . . , αn > 0 and ECs U1, . . . , Un ⊆ U s.t. the
set of states visited infinitely often by a play in (G ⇂ U)[f ]
is U1 with probability α1, . . . , Un with probability αn. By
Proposition 1, α1 + · · ·+ αn = 1. In the first step, we define
a “local” randomized memoryless strategy gi which plays as
f once inside Ui. No approximation is introduced in this
step. In the second step, we combine the local randomized
memoryless strategies gi’s above. We build a randomized
finite-memory strategy g which cycles between U1, . . . , Un
and plays according to gi inside each Ui a fraction ≈ αi of the
time. This is possible since Ui, Uj are almost surely mutually
inter-reachable due to the fact that we are always inside the
EC U . By construction, (G ⇂ U)[g] is unichain since g cycles
between all the ECs U1, . . . , Un. Moreover, for every ε > 0,
we can make the expected fraction of time spent changing
component smaller than ε. Thus, g achieves expected mean
payoff at least (1− ε) · ~ν∗ − (W, . . . ,W ) · ε, where W is the
largest absolute value of any weight in G. The latter quantity
can be made > ~ν for sufficiently small ε > 0.
F. Worst-case objective
For a MDP G, a starting state s0, and a Controller’s
strategy f ∈ ∆(G), the set of worst-case achiev-
able solutions for f is defined as WCSol+G (s0, f) =
{~µ ∈ Rd | ∀π ∈ Ωfs0 ·MP(π) > ~µ}, i.e., it is the set of vectors
~µ s.t. Controller can surely guarantee a mean payoff > ~µ
from state s0 by playing f . The set of worst-case achievable
solutions is WCSol+G (s0) =
⋃
f∈∆(G)WCSol
+
G (s0, f). Given a
state s0 and rational threshold vector ~µ ∈ Qd, the worst-case
threshold problem asks whether ~µ ∈ WCSol+G (s0).
With this worst-case interpretation, the randomized choices
in the MDP are replaced by purely adversarial ones, and the
MDP can thus be viewed as a two-player zero-sum game.
While infinite-memory strategies are more powerful than finite-
memory ones for the worst-case objective, the latter suffice to
approximate achievable vectors. We make extensive use of this
property in Sec. III-A where we restrict our attention to finite-
memory strategies.
Lemma 2 (cf. Lemma 15 of [8]). Let G be a multidimensional
mean-payoff MDP, s0 a state therein, and let ~µ ∈WCSol
+
G (s0).
There exists a pure finite-memory strategy f ∈ ∆PF(G) for
Controller s.t. ~µ ∈ WCSol+G (s0, f).
The finite-memory strategy threshold problem for multidi-
mensional mean-payoff games is coNP-complete [7], [8]. By
the lemma above, finite memory controllers suffice in our set-
ting, and we obtain the following complexity characterization.
Theorem 2 ([7], [8]). The worst-case threshold problem for
multidimensional mean-payoff MDPs is coNP-complete.
In the unidimensional case, memoryless strategies suffice for
both players [1], [2], and the complexity is NP∩coNP (and
even UP∩coUP [11], [14]). It is open since long time whether
this problem is in P.
Theorem 3 ([1], [2]). The worst-case threshold problem for
unidimensional mean-payoff MDPs is in NP∩coNP.
III. BEYOND WORST-CASE SYNTHESIS
We generalize [3] to the multidimensional setting. Given a
MDP G, a starting state s0, and a Controller’s strategy f , the
set of beyond worst-case achievable solutions for f , denoted
BWCSol+G (s0, f), is the set of pairs of vectors (~µ;~ν) ∈ R
2d
s.t. f surely guarantees a worst-case mean payoff > ~µ, and
achieves an expected mean payoff > ~ν starting from s0,
BWCSol+G (s0, f) =

 (~µ;~ν) ∈ R2d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
~µ ∈WCSol+G (s0, f)
and
~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0, f)


Let BWCSol+G (s0) =
⋃
f∈∆(G) BWCSol
+
G (s0, f) be the set of
beyond worst-case achievable solutions. Given a starting state
s0 and a pair of threshold vectors (~µ;~ν) ∈ R
2d, the beyond
worst-case threshold problem (BWC) asks whether (~µ;~ν) ∈
BWCSol+G (s0).
Remark 2. We assume w.l.o.g. that ~µ = ~0. This follows
by shifting each component by an appropriate amount. We
further assume w.l.o.g. that ~ν ≥ ~0. This follows from the fact
that, since the mean payoff is surely > ~0 by the worst-case
objective, then also the expectation is > ~0.
Remark 3. We say that G is pruned if ~0 ∈ BWCSol+G (s)
for every state s therein. Controller cannot satisfy the BWC
objective if she ever visits a state s not satisfying the worst-
case objective. Many of our results are thus stated under the
condition that G is pruned. However, pruning an MDP, i.e.,
removing those states which are losing w.r.t. the worst-case
objective, requires solving a mean-payoff game, and this will
have a crucial impact on the complexity.
The finite-memory threshold problem for the unidimensional
beyond worst-case problem has been studied in [3].
Theorem 4 ([3]). The finite-memory threshold problem for the
unidimensional beyond worst-case problem for mean-payoff
objectives is in NP∩coNP.
A. Finite-memory synthesis
In this section, we address the problem of deciding whether
there exists a finite-memory strategy for the BWC problem
in the multidimensional setting. By Proposition 1, we know
that the set of states visited infinitely often by any strategy
(not necessarily a finite-memory one) is almost surely an
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Fig. 3: Running example.
EC. The crucial observation is that, when restricted to finite-
memory, the same holds for ECs of a special kind. An EC U is
winning (WEC) iff Controller can surely guarantee the worst-
case threshold > ~0 when constrained to remain in U , starting
from any state therein. Whether a EC is winning depends on
the worst-case objective alone.
The following proposition is central in the analysis of the
BWC problem for finite-memory strategies; cf. [3, Lemma 4]
in the unidimensional case.
Proposition 2. Let f be a finite-memory strategy satisfying
the worst-case threshold problem. The set of states visited
infinitely often under f is almost surely a winning EC.
Running example. As a simple example that will be used
through the rest of the paper, consider the MDP in Fig. 3.
There are only two ECs U and V , of which U is winning, but
V is not. Indeed, from v the adversary can always select the
lower edge with payoff (30,−60). In U we can achieve expec-
tation (5, 15), and from V we can achieve expectation (15, 5).
Therefore, according to the lemma above, any finite-memory
strategy satisfying the worst-case objective will eventually go
to U almost surely.
We proceed by analyzing WECs separately in Sec. III-A1,
and then we tackle general MPDs in Sec. III-A2. This will
yield our complexity result in Sec. III-A3.
1) Inside a WEC: We show that inside WECs finite-
memory strategies always suffice for the BWC objective.
In particular, the threshold problem in WECs immediately
reduces to an expectation threshold problem.
Lemma 3. Let G be a pruned multidimensional mean-payoff
MDP, let s0 be a state in a WEC W of G, and let ~ν ∈
ExpSol+G⇂W (s0) with ~ν ≥ ~0 be an expectation achievable by
remaining inside W . There exists a randomized finite-memory
strategy h ∈ ∆F(G) s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol
+
G⇂W (s0, h) that also
remains inside W .
Remark 4. The statement of the lemma holds even with h a
pure finite-memory strategy, by applying Remark 1 when con-
structing the expectation strategy which is part of h. However,
randomized strategies suffice for our purposes.
We use finite-memory strategies defined in WECs (such as
h above) when constructing a global BWC strategy in the
analysis of arbitrary MDPs in Sec. III-A2. The construction of
h is done in a way analogous to the proof of Theorem 5 in [3];
cf. App. B for the details. However, the analysis in the multidi-
mensional case is considerably more difficult than in previous
work. It crucially relies on Lemma 1 for the extraction of finite-
memory unichain strategies approximating the expectation
objective inside ECs. Note that in the unidimensional case of
[3] optimal expectation values can be reached exactly already
by pure memoryless unichain strategies (no approximation
needed). This is an key technical difference between our
multidimensional setting and the unidimensional one of [3].
2) General case: We reduce the finite-memory BWC prob-
lem to the solution of a system of linear inequalities. This
is similar to the solution of the multidimensional expectation
problem presented in [9]. When only the expectation is con-
sidered, the intuition is that a “global expectation” is obtained
by combining together “local expectations” achieved in ECs.
Thus, a strategy for the expectation works in two phases:
Phase I: Reach ECs with appropriate probabilities.
Phase II: Once inside an EC, switch to a local expectation
strategy to achieve the right “local expectation”.
In the BWC problem, we need to enforce two extra con-
ditions: First, only “local expectations” from winning ECs
should be considered (by Proposition 2 finite-memory con-
trollers cannot stay in a non-WEC forever with non-zero
probability). Second, “local expectations” should be > ~0 in
order to satisfy the worst-case objective (a negative “local
expectation” would violate the worst-case objective). Accord-
ingly, a strategy for the BWC problem behaves as follows:
Phase I: Reach WECs with appropriate probabilities.
Phase II: Once inside a WEC, switch to a local BWC strategy
to achieve the right “local expectation” > ~0.
We write a system of linear inequalities expressing this two-
phase decomposition. W.l.o.g. we assume that state s0 belongs
to Controller, and that all WECs are reachable with positive
probability from s0 (unreachable states can be removed).
Consider the system T in Fig. 4. For each state s ∈ S we
have a variable ys, and for each edge (s, t) ∈ E we have
variables xst and yst. System T can be divided into three
parts. The first part consists of Equations (A1)–(A2). Variable
ys represents the probability that, upon visiting state s, we
switch to Phase II. Variables yst’s are used to express flow
conditions. In Eq. (A1) we put an initial flow of 1 in s0, and
we require that the total incoming flow to a state equals the
outgoing flow (including the leak ys). In Eq. (A1’) ensures that
the outgoing flow through an edge yst from a stochastic state
s is a fixed fraction of the incoming flow. Finally, Eq. (A2)
states that we switch to Phase II in a WEC almost surely.
Before explaining the other two parts of T , we need to
introduce maximal WECs. A maximal WECs (MWEC) is a
WEC which is not strictly included into another WEC. The
restriction to MWECs is crucial for complexity. The second
part of T consists of Eq. (B) and it provides a link between
Phase I and Phase II. Variable xst represents the long-run
frequency of edge (s, t). Eq. (B) links the transient behaviour
before switching inside a certain MWEC and the steady state
behaviour once inside it. More precisely, it guarantees that the
71s0(s) +
∑
(r,s)∈E
yrs =
∑
(s,t)∈E
yst + ys ∀s ∈ S (A1)
yst = R(s)(t) · (
∑
(r,s)∈E
yrs − ys) ∀(s, t) ∈ E with s ∈ S
R (A1’)
∑
MWEC U
∑
s∈U
ys = 1 (A2)∑
s∈U
ys =
∑
(r,s)∈E∩U×U
xrs ∀ MWEC U (B)
∑
(r,s)∈E
xrs =
∑
(s,t)∈E
xst ∀s ∈ S (C1)
xst = R(s)(t) ·
∑
(r,s)∈E
xrs ∀(s, t) ∈ E with s ∈ S
R (C1’)
∑
(s,t)∈E
xst · w(s, t)[i] > ~ν[i] ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ n) (C2)
∑
(s,t)∈E∩U×U
xst · w(s, t)[i] > 0 ∀ MWEC U, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (C3)
Fig. 4: Linear system T for the BWC finite-memory threshold problem.
probability to switch inside a certain MWEC equals the total
long-run frequency of all edges in the MWEC.
Finally, the remaining equations make up the third part of
T . Eq. (C1) is a flow condition for the xst’s, stating that the
incoming flow to a state equals the outgoing flow. Eq. (C1’)
forces the flow to respect the probabilities of stochastic states.
Eq. (C2) guarantees that the expected mean payoff is > ~ν, as
required. Eq. (C3) needs some justification. It is specific to our
setting and it does not follow from [9]. This equation specifies
that the expected mean payoff is > ~0 inside every MWECs. We
need to ensure that only “local” expected mean payoffs > ~0
should be considered in WECs, in order to be able to apply
the results from the previous Sec. III-A1. Eq. (C3) imposes
a seemingly strong constraint by requiring that all WECs are
visited infinitely often with positive probability. Ideally, we
would like to guess which are the MWECs which need to be
visited infinitely often with positive probability, but this would
not yield a good complexity, since there are exponentially
many different sets of MWECs. Instead, we require that
every MWEC is visited infinitely often with some positive
probability. Since we are only interested in approximating the
expectation, it is always possible to put an arbitrary small total
probability on MWECs that do not contribute to the “global”
mean payoff. This is formalized below.
Proposition 3. Let G be a pruned multidimensional mean-
payoff MDP. If there exists a finite-memory strategy h s.t.
(~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, h), then there exists a finite-memory
strategy h∗ with the same property, and such that, for every
MWEC U , the set of states visited infinitely often by h∗ is a
subset of U with positive probability.
Proof. Since by assumption all MWEC are reachable with
positive probability from s0, for every MWEC U there exists
a strategy fU reaching U with positive probability from s0.
Moreover, since U is a WEC, there exists a strategy fwcU for
the worst-case objective > ~0 that surely remains in U . Let fwc
be a worst-case strategy winning everywhere (it exists since G
is pruned by assumption). We construct the following strategy
fN parametrized by a natural number N > 0:
• Choose a MWEC U uniformly at random.
• Play fU for N steps.
– If after N steps the play is in U , then switch to fwcU .
– Otherwise, switch to fwc.
By construction fN is winning for the worst-case for every
N > 0. Moreover, it is easy to see that there exists an
N∗ sufficiently large s.t., for every MWEC U , fN∗ visits U
infinitely often with positive probability.
Finally, the strategy h∗ plays with probability p > 0 ac-
cording to fN∗ , and otherwise according to h. Since both fN∗
and h are winning for the worst-case, so it is h∗. The expected
mean payoff of h∗ converges from below to the expected mean
payoff of h for p > 0 sufficiently small. Therefore, there exists
p > 0 s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, h
∗).
We now state the correctness of the reduction.
Lemma 4. Let G be a pruned multidimensional mean-payoff
MDP, let s0 ∈ S, and let ~ν ≥ ~0. There exists a finite-memory
strategy h s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, h), if, and only if, the
system T has a non-negative solution.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the lemma
above. Both directions are non-trivial. For the right-to-left
direction, we need to explain which kind of strategies can
be extracted from a non-negative solution of T . The following
lemma shows that from a non-negative solution of T we can
extract a strategy for the expectation combining only “local
mean payoffs” > ~0 and visiting infinitely often each MWEC
with positive probability.
8Proposition 4. If T has a non-negative solution, then there
exists a finite-memory strategy hˆ s.t. ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0, hˆ), and
1) For every MWEC U , there is a probability y∗U > 0 s.t.
the set of states visited infinitely often by hˆ is a subset of
U with probability y∗U .
2) Once hˆ reaches the MWEC U , it achieves expected mean
payoff ~νU > ~0.
3)
∑
MWEC U y
∗
U · ~νU > ~ν.
Proof. Let {y∗s}s∈S , {y
∗
st}(s,t)∈E , and {x
∗
st}(s,t)∈E be a non-
negative solution to T . Proposition 4.2 of [9] essentially shows
how to construct from the solution above a finite-memory
strategy hˆ s.t. ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0, hˆ).
For a MWEC U , let
y∗U =
∑
s∈U
y∗s (1)
By Eq. (C3), for every MWEC U there exist s, t ∈ U s.t.
x∗st > 0. Together with Eq. (B), this implies that y
∗
U > 0,
which proves Point 1.
For a MWEC U , let
~νU =
∑
(s,t)∈E∩U×U
x∗st · w(s, t) (2)
and notice that ~νU is the expected mean payoff of hˆ once
inside U . By Eq. (C3), ~νU > ~0, which proves Point 2.
Eq. (B) implies that hˆ eventually stays forever inside a WEC
almost surely. Consequently,
∑
MWEC U y
∗
U = 1. Since states
visited infinitely often with probability zero do not contribute
to the expected mean payoff, it suffices to look at MWECs.
By the prefix independence of the mean payoff value function,
and since MWEC U is reached with probability y∗U , strategy
hˆ achieves expected mean payoff
∑
MWECU y
∗
U · ~νU . By Point
1), the latter quantity is > ~ν.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.
Proof of Lemma 4. For the left-to-right direction, assume
that h is a finite-memory strategy guaranteeing (~0;~ν) ∈
BWCSol+G (s, h). Proposition 4.4 of [9] essentially shows that
any strategy satisfying the expectation objective > ~ν induces
a solution to T satisfying Equations (A1)–(C2), except that
Eq. (B) should be interpreted over MECs (instead of MWECs).
(This follows from the fact that the set of states visited
infinitely often by any strategy is an EC almost surely; cf.
Proposition 1.) However, since ~0 ∈ WCSol+G (s, h) and h is
finite-memory, we can apply Proposition 2 and deduce that h
visits infinitely often a winning EC almost surely. Thus Eq. (B)
is satisfied even over MWECs.
It remains to address Eq. (C3). By Proposition 3, there exists
a strategy h∗ s.t., for every MWEC U , h∗ eventually stays
forever in U with a positive probability. This implies that,
when constructing a solution to T induced by h∗ (as above),
for every MWEC U and s, t ∈ U , x∗st > 0. Moreover, since
h∗ is winning for the worst-case, it achieves an expected mean
payoff > ~0 in U , and thus Eq. (C3) is satisfied.
For the right-to-left direction, assume that T has a non-
negative solution. Let hˆ be the strategy in G given by Proposi-
tion 4. For every MWEC U , let y∗U and ~νU be as given in the
statement of the proposition. While hˆ alone is not sufficient to
show (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s) since it does not satisfy the worst-
case objective in general, we show how to construct from
it another finite-memory strategy hcmb ensuring the BWC
objective. The latter strategy is obtained by combining together
the following strategies:
• Let hwc be a finite-memory strategy in G ensuring the
worst-case mean payoff ~0 ∈ WCSol+G (t, h
wc) from every
state t in G. This is possible since G is pruned.
• For each MWEC U , let hU be a finite-memory strategy
s.t. (~0;~νU ) ∈ BWCSol
+
G (t, hU ) for every state t ∈ U .
This strategy can be obtained as follows. Let G ⇂ U
be the game G restricted to the EC U . By Point 2 of
Proposition 4, ~νU ∈ ExpSol
+
G⇂U (t0, hU ) for some state
t0 ∈ U . Since U is an EC, ~νU ∈ ExpSol
+
G⇂U (t, hU ) for
every state t ∈ U . Since ~νU > ~0, we can apply Lemma 3
for every t ∈ U , and obtain a strategy ht s.t. (~0;~νU ) ∈
BWCSol+G⇂U (t, ht). Let hU be the finite-memory strategy
in G ⇂ U that plays according to ht when starting from
state t. Clearly, (~0;~νU ) ∈ BWCSol
+
G⇂U (t, hU ).
Consider the strategy hcmbN parameterized by a natural number
N > 0 which is defined as follows:
1) Play according to hˆ for N steps.
2) After N steps:
2a) If we are inside the MWEC U , then switch to hU .
2b) Otherwise, play according to hwc.
We argue that hcmbN satisfies the beyond worst-case objective
(~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, h
cmb
N ) for N large enough. For every
N , hcmbN clearly satisfies the worst-case objective, since after
N steps it switches to a strategy that satisfies it by construc-
tion (by prefix-independence of the mean payoff objective).
We now consider the expectation objective. By Point 1 of
Proposition 4, the set of states visited infinitely often by
hˆ is a subset of the MWEC U with probability y∗U . By
taking N large enough, we can guarantee being inside U with
probability arbitrarily close to y∗U . By construction, hU can
be chosen to achieve expected mean payoff arbitrarily close
to ~νU . Since h
cmb
N switches to hU with probability arbitrarily
close to y∗U , h
cmb
N achieves expected mean payoff arbitrarily
close to
∑
MWEC U y
∗
U · ~νU . By Point 3 of Proposition 4, the
latter quantity is > ~ν. There exists N∗ large enough s.t. hcmbN∗
achieves expected mean payoff > ~ν. Take hcmb = hcmbN∗ . As
required, ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0, h
cmb).
Running example. Since U = {t} is a MWEC, while
V = {u, v} is not, finite memory strategies must go to U .
Therefore, with finite memory we can ensure BWC threshold
((0, 0); (0, 9)), but not ((0, 0); (9, 9)) for example.
3) Complexity: We obtain the following complexity char-
acterization for the threshold problem with finite-memory
controllers.
Theorem 5. The finite-memory multidimensional mean-payoff
BWC threshold problem is coNP-complete.
Proof. Pruning states where the worst-case objective cannot
be satisfied requires solving multidimensional mean-payoff
games, which can be done in coNP by Theorem 2. It has
9been already shown in [3] how the decomposition in MWEC
can be performed in Pwith an oracle for solving mean-payoff
games. Thus, the MWEC decomposition can be performed in
coNP. System T has size polynomial in G (there are only poly-
nomially many MWECs) and it can thus be produced in coNP.
By Lemma 4, it suffices to solve system T , which can be done
in polynomial time by linear programming. The lower bound
follows directly from the fact that the multidimensional BWC
threshold problem contains the worst-case as a subproblem;
the latter is coNP-hard as recalled in Theorem 2.
The complexity of the BWC problem is dominated by the
worst-case subproblem. We obtain an improved complexity
by restricting the worst-case to be essentially unidimensional.
Formally, we say that a BWC threshold (~µ;~ν) ∈ R2d has
trivial worst-case component i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ d, iff ~µ[i] = −W ,
where W is the maximal absolute value of any weight in G.
We say that (~µ;~ν) is essentially worst-case unidimensional iff
it has at most one non-trivial worst-case component. We can
ignore trivial components when solving a worst-case threshold
problem. Thus, the worst-case problem for essentially uni-
dimensional thresholds reduces to a simple unidimensional
worst-case problem. As recalled in Theorem 3, the latter can
be solved in NP∩coNP, thus yielding the following improved
complexity for the BWC problem.
Corollary 1. The finite-memory multidimensional mean-payoff
BWC threshold problem w.r.t. essentially worst-case unidimen-
sional thresholds is in NP∩coNP.
Since the unidimensional BWC problem, i.e., where all
weights are unidimensional, is in NP∩coNP (cf. Theorem 4),
this results shows that we can add a multidimensional ex-
pectation objective to a unidimensional worst-case obligation
without an extra price in complexity. In particular, we can
model complex situations like the task system presented in
Sec. I-C, where the worst-case and expectation mean payoffs
are along independent dimensions.
B. Infinite-memory synthesis
Already in the unidimensional case, infinite-memory strate-
gies are more powerful than finite-memory ones (cf. [4, Fig.
6]). This is a consequence of the fact that finite-memory
strategies for the BWC objective ultimately remain inside
WECs almost surely (cf. Proposition 2). On the other hand,
infinite-memory strategies can benefit from payoffs achievable
inside arbitrary ECs. In this section, we address the problem
of deciding whether there exists a general strategy, i.e., not
necessarily finite-memory one, for the multidimensional BWC
problem. This was left as an open problem, already in the
unidimensional case [3]. As in the previous section, we first
analyze ECs, and then general MDPs.
1) Inside an EC: The lemma below is a direct generaliza-
tion of Lemma 2 to arbitrary ECs. While for WECs we could
construct finite-memory strategies, we now construct infinite-
memory strategies for arbitrary ECs.
Lemma 5. Let G be a pruned multidimensional mean-payoff
MDP, let s0 be a state in an EC U of MDP, and let ~ν ≥ ~0 be
an expectation vector ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G⇂U (s0) which is achievable
while remaining in U . There exists a strategy f ∈ ∆(G) (not
necessarily remaining in U ) s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, f).
Remark 5. The statement of the lemma holds even with f
a pure strategy, by applying Remark 1 when constructing
the expectation strategy fexp below. However, randomized
strategies suffice for our purposes.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 5.
We proceed by combining in a non-trivial way a strategy for
the expectation with a strategy for the worst-case. Let fwc be a
worst-case strategy s.t. ~0 ∈WCSol+G (s, f
wc) for every state s,
which exists since the G is pruned. Let fexp be a expectation
strategy s.t. ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G⇂U (s0, f
exp). By Lemma 1, we can
assume that fexp is finite-memory and unichain. For technical
reasons, it is convenient to assume that fexp is finite-memory,
even though we are going to construct a infinite-memory
strategy. Moreover, since we are in an EC, we can further
assume that fexp achieves expectation > ~ν from every state
of the EC.
The idea is to play according to two different modes. In the
first mode, we play according to fexp, and in the second mode
according to fwc. We start in the first mode, and possibly go to
the second mode according to certain conditions. This happens
with a certain probability, which we call switching probability.
Once in the second mode, we remain in the second mode.
In order to achieve an expectation arbitrarily close to that
achieved by fexp, we need to be able to make the switching
probability arbitrarily small. At the same time, in order to
ensure that the worst-case objective is satisfied, we need to
guarantee that, when no switch occurs, the mean payoff is
surely > ~0. (If a switch occurs, the worst-case is satisfied by
the definition of fwc.) These two constraints are conflicting
and make the construction of a combined strategy non-trivial.
The combined strategy fK is parameterized by a natural
number K > 0. In order to decide whether to switch to the
second mode or not, we keep track of the total payoff since
the beginning of the play as a vector in Zd. This value is
unbounded in general, and this is explains why the strategy
uses infinite memory. Let ~Ni be
~Ni =
~ν · i ·K
2
.
Thus, during the first mode the expected total payoff at the end
of phase i is > 2 · ~Ni+1. The first mode is split into phases,
each of length K . During phase i ≥ 0, we play according to
fexp for at most K steps. There are two conditions that can
trigger a switch to the second mode:
[Switching condition 1 (SC1)] If we are in phase i ≥ 1 and
the total payoff since the beginning of the play is not
always > ~Ni during the current phase, then switch to
fwc permanently.
[Switching condition 2 (SC2)] If the total payoff since the
beginning of the play is not > 2 · ~Ni+1 at the end of the
current phase, then switch to fwc permanently.
What it remains to do is to show that we can choose K > 0
in order to satisfy the BWC objective. First, we show that, for
every choice of the parameter K , the combined strategy fK
guarantees the worst-case objective.
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Proposition 5. For every K ∈ N and state s0 in the EC U ,
~0 ∈WCSol+G (s0, fK).
Proof. There are two cases to consider. If we ever switch to
the second mode, then the run is eventually consistent with the
worst-case strategy fwc, which guarantees worst-case mean
payoff > ~0 (by prefix independence). Otherwise, assume that
we never leave the first mode. During phase i ≥ 1 the total
payoff is always > ~Ni =
~ν·i·K
2 , and the total length of the
play is at most i ·K . The average mean payoff during phase
i is uniformly > ~ν2 . The limit inferior of the average mean
payoff is also > ~ν2 ≥
~0.
We conclude by showing that K can be chosen s.t. the
combined strategy fK achieves expected mean payoff > ~ν.
Lemma 6. There exists K ∈ N s.t. ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0, fK).
Proof. We show that we can choose a K > 0 large enough s.t.
the switching probability is negligible, and thus the impact of
switching to the worst-case strategy fwc on the expected mean
payoff is also negligible. For now fix an arbitrary K > 0, and
consider the Markov chain G[fK ]. Let pK be the probability
to switch to the second mode due to SC1 in any phase i ≥ 1,
and let qK be the probability to switch to the second mode
due to SC2 in any phase i ≥ 0. Thus, with probability at most
1−(1−pK)·(1−qK) we switch to the second mode. By prefix
independence of the mean payoff objective, the expected mean
payoff achieved by fK satisfies:
EGs0,fK [MP] ≥ (1 − (1− pK) · (1− qK)) · E
G
s0,fwc
[MP] +
+(1 − pK) · (1− qK) · E
G
s0,fexp
[MP]
Since E
G⇂U
s,fexp [MP] > ~ν by definition, it suffices to show that
both probabilities pK and qK can be made arbitrarily small.
We argue about them separately.
Let pi,K be the probability of switching to the second mode
due to SC1 during phase i ≥ 1, i.e, the probability that the
total payoff goes below ~Ni in any component:
pi,K = P
G[fK ]
s0
[
∃(K · i ≤ h < K · (i+ 1)) · TPh 6> ~Ni
]
Then, pK = p1,K+(1−p1,K) ·p2,K+(1−p1,K) · (1−p2,K) ·
p3,K + . . . , and thus pK ≤ p1,K + p2,K + . . . . We claim the
following exponential upper bound on pi,K .
Claim 1. There are rational constants a and b with b < 1 s.t.,
for every i ≥ 1 and for sufficiently large K , pi,K ≤ a · bK·i.
Note that a and b do not depend neither on K , nor on i.
By the claim, pK ≤ a · (bK + bK·2 + . . . ) ≤ a · bK/(1− bK),
and thus limK pK = 0 since b
K < 1.
Let qi,K be the probability of switching to the second mode
due to SC2 at the end of phase i ≥ 0. Thus, qi,K is the
probability that, at the end of phase i, the total payoff is less
than 2 · ~Ni+1 = ~ν · (i+ 1) ·K in any component:
qi,K = P
G[fK ]
s0
[
TPK·(i+1) 6> 2 · ~Ni+1
]
We have qK = q0,K+(1−q0,K)·q1,K+(1−q0,K)·(1−q1,K)·
q2,K + . . . . We show limK qK = 0 as in the last paragraph,
by the following claim.
Claim 2. There exist rational constants a and b with b < 1 s.t.,
for every i ≥ 0 and sufficiently large K , qi,K ≤ a · bK·(i+1).
Note that a and b do not depend neither on K , nor on i.
Both claims are proved in the appendix.
2) The general case: As in the synthesis for finite-memory
strategies (cf. Sec. III-A), we reduce the infinite-memory BWC
problem to the solution of a system of linear inequalities. The
new system of equations T ′ is shown in Fig. 5. It is obtained
as a modification of system T from the finite-memory case
shown in Fig. 4: Specifically, T ′ is the same as T , except
that Equations (A2), (B), and (C3) are interpreted w.r.t. MEC
(instead of MWEC). The correctness of the reduction is stated
in the lemma below.
Lemma 7. Let G be a pruned multidimensional mean-payoff
MDP, let ~ν ≥ ~0, and let s0 ∈ S. There exists a (possibly
infinite-memory) strategy h s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, h), if,
and only if, the system T ′ has a non-negative solution.
Proof sketch. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.
The crucial difference is that, by the modifications performed
to obtain T ′ from T , we obtain strategies which almost surely
stay forever inside ECs, instead of WECs. Since we are
allowed infinite-memory, we can approximate the BWC ob-
jective inside ECs by replacing Lemma 2 with Lemma 5.
Running example. An infinite-memory strategy can benefit
both from the expectation (5, 15) in U and from (15, 5) in
V (which is not a WEC). By going to either EC with equal
probability and playing according to a local BWC strategy,
an infinite-memory strategy can ensure, for every ε > 0, the
BWC threshold ((0, 0); (10− ε, 10− ε)).
3) Complexity: We obtain the following complexity result
for the threshold problem for arbitrary controllers.
Theorem 6. The multidimensional mean-payoff BWC thresh-
old problem is coNP-complete.
Proof. Pruning the game to remove states which are losing for
the worst-case objective requires solving a multidimensional
mean-payoff game, which is coNP-complete by Theorem 2.
Then, by Lemma 7, it suffices to solve system L′. Notice
that system L′ is of polynomial size since there are only
polynomially many maximal ECs.
Again, it is the worst-case problem that dominates the
complexity of the BWC problem. By restricting to essentially
worst-case unidimensional thresholds we obtain a better com-
plexity, as in Sec. III-A3.
Corollary 2. The multidimensional mean-payoff BWC thresh-
old problem w.r.t. essentially worst-case unidimensional thresh-
olds is in NP∩coNP.
This solves with optimal complexity the infinite-memory uni-
dimensional BWC problem, which was left open in [3].
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1s0(s) +
∑
(r,s)∈E
yrs =
∑
(s,t)∈E
yst + ys ∀s ∈ S (A1)
yst = R(s)(t) · (
∑
(r,s)∈E
yrs − ys) ∀(s, t) ∈ E with s ∈ S
R (A1’)
∑
MEC U
∑
s∈U
ys = 1 (A2-bis)∑
s∈U
ys =
∑
(r,s)∈E∩U×U
xrs ∀ MEC U (B-bis)
∑
(r,s)∈E
xrs =
∑
(s,t)∈E
xst ∀s ∈ S (C1)
xst = R(s)(t) ·
∑
(r,s)∈E
xrs ∀(s, t) ∈ E with s ∈ S
R (C1’)
∑
(s,t)∈E
xst · w(s, t)[i] > ~ν[i] ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ n) (C2)
∑
(s,t)∈E∩U×U
xst · w(s, t)[i] > 0 ∀ MEC U, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (C3-bis)
Fig. 5: Linear system T ′ for the BWC infinite-memory threshold problem.
IV. BEYOND ALMOST-SURE SYNTHESIS
We introduce a natural relaxation of the BWC problem
which enjoys a better complexity. Intuitively, we replace the
worst-case objective in the BWC problem with a weaker
almost sure objective. While the BWC problem is coNP-
complete, we show that this relaxation can be solved in P, even
in the multidimensional setting. A similar result has recently
been obtained in [5]. Given an MDP G, a starting state s0
therein, and a Controller’s strategy f ∈ ∆(G), the set of almost
sure achievable solutions for f , denoted ASSol+G(s0, f), is
the set of vectors ~µ ∈ Rd s.t. Controller can almost surely
guarantee mean payoff > ~µ when playing according to f ,
i.e., ASSol+G(s, f) =
{
~µ ∈ Rd
∣∣∣ PGs,f [MP > ~µ] = 1}. The
set of beyond almost-sure achievable solutions for f , denoted
BASSol+G (s0, f), is the set of pairs of vectors (~µ;~ν) ∈ R
2d s.t.
Controller can almost surely guarantee mean payoff > ~µ and
achieve expected mean payoff > ~ν when starting from s0 and
playing according to f , i.e.,
BASSol+G (s0, f) =

 (~µ;~ν) ∈ R2d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
~µ ∈ ASSol+G(s0, f)
and
~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0, f)


The set of beyond almost-sure achievable solutions is
BASSol+G (s0) =
⋃
f∈∆(G) BASSol
+
G (s0, f). Given (~µ;~ν) ∈
R2d and a state s0, the beyond almost-sure threshold problem
asks whether (~µ;~ν) ∈ BASSol+G (s0).
Remark 6. We assume w.l.o.g. that ~µ = ~0 and ~ν ≥ ~0. The first
condition is ensured by subtracting ~µ everywhere. The second
condition follows from the observation that, if the mean payoff
is > ~0 almost surely, then also the expectation is > ~0 surely.
We observe that, inside an EC, there is no trade-off between
the almost sure and the expectation objective.
Lemma 8. Let G be a multidimensional mean-payoff MDP, let
s0 be a state in an EC U thereof, and let ~ν ∈ ExpSol
+
G⇂U (s0)
be an expectation achievable while remaining inside U . There
exists a finite-memory strategy g ∈ ∆F(G) s.t. (~ν;~ν) ∈
BASSol+G⇂U (s0, g) which also remains inside U .
Proof. By Lemma 1, there exists a finite-memory strategy g
s.t. ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G⇂U (s0, g) and G[g] is unichain. Consequently,
the mean payoff is > ~ν almost surely.
Thus, most of the effort goes in analyzing the general case.
As in the BWC problem, we reduce the BAS problem to the
solution of a system of linear inequalities. We assume that
from state s0 all ECs are reachable with positive probability.
It turns out that the same system of equations T ′ used in
the infinite-memory BWC threshold problem also solves the
BAS problem. We obtain a better complexity since we do
not require the MDP to be pruned (which avoids solving an
expensive mean-payoff game).
Theorem 7. The multidimensional mean-payoff BAS threshold
problem is in P.
Proof. The proof of correctness is the same as in Lemma 7,
where Lemma 8 replaces Lemma 5 in the analysis of ECs.
Crucially for complexity, we do not need to assume that
the MDP is pruned. Therefore, system T ′ can be built (and
solved) in P. Since Lemma 8 even yields finite-memory
strategies inside an EC, the construction of Lemma 7 shows
that finite-memory strategies suffice for the BAS threshold
problem. (This relies on the strict BAS semantics. If non-strict
inequalities are used, then the problem can still be solved in P
but the construction above yields an infinite-memory strategy,
and infinite-memory strategies are more powerful than finite-
memory ones for the non-strict BAS problem; cf. also [5].)
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Running example. The BAS problem is strictly weaker than
the BWC problem. Consider the MDP from Fig. 3 without the
edge (u, t). This modification makes both states u and v losing
for the worst-case, thus they are pruned away when solving the
BWC problem (even with infinite memory). On the other hand,
the mean payoff is almost surely (5, 15) from V , and thus
it satisfies the almost sure objective > (0, 0). Therefore, for
every ε > 0, we can achieve the BAS threshold ((0, 0); (10−
ε, 10− ε)) by going to t or u with equal probability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the multidimensional generaliza-
tion of the beyond worst-case problem introduced by Bruye`re
et al. [3]. We have provided tight coNP-completeness results
for the this problem under both finite-memory and general
strategies. Since multidimensional mean-payoff games are al-
ready coNP-complete, our upper bound shows that we can add
a multidimensional expectation optimization objective on top
of a worst-case requirement without a corresponding increase
in complexity. Notice that, while infinite-memory strategies
were known to be more powerful than finite-memory ones
already in the unidimensional setting [3], the corresponding
synthesis problem was left open. Our results thus complete
the complexity picture for this problem. Moreover, we showed
that, when the worst-case objective is unidimensional, the
complexity reduces to NP∩coNP, and this holds even for
multidimensional expectations. This generalizes with optimal
complexity the NP∩coNP upper bound for the unidimensional
beyond worst-case problem [3]. From a practical point of
view, our reductions to linear programming can be performed
in pseudo-polynomial time by using the results of [15] for
unidimensional mean-payoff games, and [16] for fixed number
of dimensions. Furthermore, we introduced the beyond almost-
sure problem as a natural relaxation of the beyond worst-
case problem, by weakening the worst-case requirement to an
almost-sure one. This natural relaxation enjoys a polynomial
time solution and finite memory strategies always suffice.
Moreover, our reduction to linear programming shows that
the beyond almost-sure problem is amenable to be solved
efficiently in practice, and thus it has the strongest appeal for
practical applications.
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES
A. Hoeffding-style bounds
In this section, we prove an Hoeffding-style bound for multidimensional Markov chains which will be used repeatedly in
later proofs. Let G be a Markov chain which is unichain. Recall that a Markov chain is unichain when it consists of transient
states and a unique bottom strongly connected component. Thus, any run in G will be trapped almost surely in the bottom
component, and the mean payoff will be almost surely equal to the expected mean payoff. Moreover, the expected mean payoff
is the same from every starting state of G. Below, we present a bound on the probability that the mean payoff deviates from
the expected mean payoff for sufficiently long runs. Let d ≥ 1 be the dimension of the weights in the Markov chain G, and
let ~ν be the expected mean-payoff vector from any state in G.
Lemma 9. For any δ > 0, there exists K0 = O(
1
δ2 ) ∈ N and constants a, b > 0 s.t., for all K ≥ K0 and state s,
PGs [∃(1 ≤ j ≤ d) · |(MPK − ~ν)[j]| ≥ δ] ≤ G (K, δ) := 2
d · a · e−b·K·δ
2
.
Moreover, a and b are polynomial in the parameters of the Markov chain, a is exponential in δ, and K0 is polynomial in the
size of the Markov chain and in the largest absolute weight W (and thus exponential in its encoding).
We prove the lemma above by reducing to the unidimensional case d = 1. The latter case was already dealt with in [4, Lemma
9], which in turns relies on [17, Proposition 2].
Lemma 10 (cf. [4, Lemma 9]). For any δ > 0, there exist K0 = O(
1
δ ) ∈ N and constants a, b > 0 s.t., for all K ≥ K0 and
state s,
PGs [|MPK − ν| ≥ δ] ≤ Fa,b (K, δ) := a · e
−b·K·δ2 .
Moreover, a and b are polynomial in the parameters of the Markov chain, a is exponential in δ. and, K0 is polynomial in the
size of the Markov chain and in the largest weight W (and thus exponential in its encoding).
Proof of Lemma 9. In the following, fix an error δ > 0 and a number of steps K > 0. For a component 1 ≤ j ≤ d, we say
that a run π is j-bad iff the j-th component of the mean payoff deviates from ~ν[j] at least by δ after K steps, i.e., if
|(MP(π(K))− ~ν)[j]| ≥ δ
and π is j-good otherwise. Moreover, we say that π is bad if it is j-bad for some 1 ≤ j ≤ d, and we say that π is good it is
j-good for every 1 ≤ j ≤ d. In other words, π is good if for every component j, |(MP(π(K))− ~ν)[j]| < δ.
For a fixed dimension 1 ≤ j ≤ d, we are in the unidimensional case, dealt with in Lemma 10. Let j be a fixed dimension.
By Lemma 10, there exist constants aj , bj > 0, and Kj = O(
1
δ ) ∈ N s.t., for every K ≥ Kj and state s, Faj ,bj (K, δ) is an
upper bound on the probability that π is j-bad. We want to choose uniform a, b > 0 and K0 s.t.
Faj,bj (K, δ) ≤ Fa,b (K, δ) < 1
for every K ≥ K0. To this end, let
a := max
j
aj,
b := min
j
bj , and
K0 := max{max
j
Kj,
⌈
ln a
b · δ2
⌉
+ 1} .
Note that K0 = O(
1
δ2 ). Then, 1−Fa,b (K, δ) is a lower bound on the probability that π is j-good, for any fixed j and K ≥ K0.
Then, (1 −Fa,b (K, δ))d is a lower bound on the probability that π is good. We derive the following simple lower bound on
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the latter quantity:
(1−Fa,b (K, δ))
d =
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
(−Fa,b (K, δ))
i =
= 1 +
d∑
i=1
(
d
i
)
(−Fa,b (K, δ))
i
≥ 1−
d∑
i=1
(
d
i
)
(Fa,b (K, δ))
i
≥ 1−
d∑
i=1
(
d
i
)
Fa,b (K, δ)
≥ 1− 2d · Fa,b (K, δ)
Finally, 1− (1−Fa,b (K, δ))d is an upper bound on the probability that π is bad. We define
G (K, δ) := 2d · Fa,b (K, δ) = 2
d · a · e−b·K·δ
2
By the inequality above, G (K, δ) ≥ 1 − (1 − Fa,b (K, δ))d, and thus G (K, δ) is an upper bound on the probability that a
period is bad for every K ≥ K0.
B. Mean-payoff value function
We make a couple of simple observations on the relationship between the mean-payoff value function and the total-payoff
value function.
Lemma 11. Let π be a play in a graph G.
1) If MP(π) > 0, then TP(π) = +∞. Therefore, if TP(π) < +∞ (with possibly TP(π) = −∞), then MP(π) ≤ 0.
2) Similarly, if MP(π) < 0, then TP(π) = −∞.
3) There exists a play π0 in a finite graph G0 s.t. MP(π0) = 0, but TP(π0) = +∞.
4) There exists a play π1 in a finite graph G1 s.t. MP(π1) = 0, but TP(π1) = −∞.
Proof. We first prove Point 1). Assume MP(π) = a for some a > 0. By the definition of lim inf , for every ε > 0 there
exists m0 s.t. for every m ≥ m0 we have MP(π(m)) ≥ a− ε. To show TP(π) = +∞ we show that for every bound b > 0,
there exists n0 s.t. for every n ≥ n0, TP(π(n)) ≥ b. Let b > 0. If we take ε := a/2 in the definition above, we have that
there exists m0 s.t. for every m ≥ m0 MP(π(m)) ≥ a/2 > 0. We take n0 := max{m0, 2b/a}, and let n ≥ n0. Since
TP(π(n)) = n ·MP(π(n)), we have TP(π(n)) ≥ na/2 ≥ b, where the latter inequality follows from the definition of n0.
The proof of Point 2) is analogous to the proof of Point 1).
For Point 3), consider a play π0 inducing the following sequence of payoffs:
1︸︷︷︸
20
10︸︷︷︸
21
1000︸︷︷︸
22
10000000︸ ︷︷ ︸
23
· · ·
i.e., the n-th payoff is 1 if n is a power of 2, and 0 otherwise. Then, TP(π0(n)) = k where k is the largest exponent s.t.
2k ≤ n, i.e., k = ⌊lgn⌋. Thus, TP(π0) = +∞. However, MP(π0(n)) =
⌊lg n⌋
n goes to 0 as n goes to +∞. Thus, MP(π0) = 0.
Point 4) is proved analogously by taking the sequence
(−1)︸︷︷︸
20
(−1)0︸ ︷︷ ︸
21
(−1)000︸ ︷︷ ︸
22
(−1)0000000︸ ︷︷ ︸
23
· · ·
As an application of Lemma 10, we show that if the total payoff is −∞ almost surely, then the mean payoff is strictly
negative almost surely. This contrasts with Point 4) in Lemma 11, which showed that there are infinite runs with total payoff
equal to −∞, but which have nonetheless zero mean payoff. (Notice that the infinite play constructed in the proof of the latter
lemma with this property was non-periodic.) We use the lemma below later in the proof of Lemma 21.
Lemma 12. Let G be a Markov chain. For every state s0,
PGs0 [TP = −∞] = P
G
s0 [MP < 0] .
In particular, if the mean payoff is non-negative almost surely, then the total payoff is > −∞ almost surely.
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∑
s∈S
xs = 1 (EC-1)
xs =
∑
(r,s)∈E
xrs ∀s ∈ S (EC-IN)
xs =
∑
(s,t)∈E
xst ∀s ∈ S (EC-OUT)
xst = R(s)(t) · xs ∀(s, t) ∈ E with s ∈ S
R (EC-RAND)∑
(s,t)∈E
xst · w(s, t)[i] ≥ ~ν[i] ∀(1 ≤ i ≤ d) (EC-MP)
Fig. 6: System of linear inequalities for the expectation problem inside an EC.
Proof. Fix a state s0. Let p = P
G
s0 [MP < 0], q = P
G
s0 [TP = −∞], and, for a BSCC B, let pB be the probability of reaching
B. In a BSCC B, MP and TP take value equal to their respective expectations almost surely, and this value is the same from
every state in the BSCC. Let this value be EGB [MP] and E
G
B [TP], respectively. We thus have the following decomposition:
p =
∑
BSCC B s.t. EGB [MP]<0
pB, and
q =
∑
BSCC B s.t. EGB [TP]=−∞
pB .
It suffices to show that EGB [MP] < 0 if, and only if, E
G
B [TP] = −∞ for all BSCC’s B.
If EGB [MP] < 0, then MP < 0 almost surely since B is a BSCC. By Point 2) of Lemma 11, MP < 0 implies TP = −∞
surely, and thus TP = −∞ holds almost surely, and consequently EGB [TP] = −∞.
For the other direction, let EGB [MP] ≥ 0. If E
G
B [MP] > 0, then by Point 1) of Lemma 11 and reasoning as above, we obtain
EGB [TP] = +∞. It remains to prove the case E
G
B [MP] = 0. This makes use of the bound provided by Lemma 10, and it does
not hold in a non-probabilistic setting (cf. the counter-example in Point 4) of Lemma 11). Assume EGB [MP] = 0. We prove
EGB [TP] > −∞. For every s1 ∈ B and K , we have
PGs1 [TPK ≤ −K] ≤ P
G
s1 [MPK ≤ −1]
≤ PGs1 [|MPK | ≥ 1]
≤ Fa,b (K, 1)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 10 applied with ν = EGB [MP] = 0, δ = 1, for some constants a, b > 0 and for K
sufficiently large. Since Fa,b (K, 1)→ 0 as K →∞, we have that P
G
s1 [TP = −∞] = 0, which implies E
G
B [TP] > −∞.
C. Finite-memory synthesis in an EC
In this section, we show that achievable values can be approximated by randomized finite-memory strategies in ECs, with
the further property that the induced (finite) Markov chain is unichain, i.e., it contains exactly one BSCC.
Lemma 1. Let G be a multidimensional mean-payoff MDP, let s0 be a state in an EC U thereof, and let ~ν ∈ ExpSol
+
G⇂U (s0) be
an expectation vector achievable by remaining inside U . There exists a finite-memory unichain strategy g ∈ ∆F(G) achieving
the same expectation ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G⇂U (s0, g).
We prove this result as follows. First, in Sec. A-C1 we characterize the set of of achievable vectors as non-negative solutions
to a linear programming problem (in the spirit of [9]). This yields a natural decomposition of the EC into several SCCs.
For each such SCC, we construct in Sec. A-C2 a randomized memoryless “local strategy” achieving a corresponding “local
expectation”. No approximation error is introduced in this step. Then, in Sec. A-C3 we combine those “local strategies” into
a randomized finite-memory “global strategy” approximating the expectation. This second step uses the fact that in an EC all
states are inter-reachable (under some strategy), and thus we can cycle through all the “local strategies” for the appropriate
fraction of time. This step introduces an approximation error, due to the cost of moving from a SCC to the next one. However,
by using larger amounts of finite memory, we can make this error arbitrarily small.
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1) Decomposition in SCCs: In the following, let G = (G,S0, SR, R) with G = (d, S,E,w) be a fixed MDP. W.l.o.g. we
assume that G is reduced to a single EC S. Let ~ν ∈ Qd be an expected-value achievable vector. Consider the linear program
A~ν of Fig. 6. (Cf. [9] for a similar linear program in the more general case where the MDP is not just an EC.). We use the
linear program A~ν to obtain the long-run “frequencies” of edges guaranteeing mean payoff ~ν. For each state s ∈ S, we have
a variable xs representing the long-run probability to be in s, and, for each edge (s, t) ∈ E, we have a variable xst for the
long-run probability of taking edge (s, t). In the following, let
ExpSolG(s0, f) = {~ν ∈ R
d | EGs0,f [MP] ≥ ~ν} ,
ExpSolG(s0) =
⋃
f∈∆(G)
ExpSolG(s0, f) .
The lemma below shows that A~ν has a non-negative solution if ~ν is achievable in G. Correctness follows directly from the
analysis of [9]. The complexity of the solution follows from [18, Theorem 10.1]. In the statement below, recall that W is the
maximum absolute value of any weight in G, and Q is be the largest denominator of any probability appearing therein.
Lemma 13. Let G be a multidimensional mean payoff MDP reduced to a single EC S, let s0 ∈ S be a state therein, and let
~ν ∈ ExpSolG(s0) be an achievable value for the expectation. Then, the system A~ν has a non-negative solution of size
3 bounded
by a polynomial in W and Q.
Let {x˜st}(s,t)∈E , {x˜s}s∈S be a non-negative solution to A~ν of complexity polynomial in W and Q. This allows us to
perform the following decomposition of G into strongly connected components. Let S>0 be the set of states visited with
(strictly) positive long-run average probability, and let E>0 be the set of edges visited with (strictly) positive long-run average
probability:
S>0 = {s ∈ S | x˜s > 0}
E>0 = {(s, t) ∈ E | x˜st > 0}
By the flow conditions of A~ν , E>0 = E ∩ (S>0×S>0), i.e., positive edges are exactly those connecting positive states. States
in S>0 can be partitioned into maximal strongly connected components {S1, . . . , Sk} (w.r.t. E>0), such that there is no positive
edge between different components. Since states in Si have at least one successor (as Si ⊆ S>0) and all successors are in fact
inside Si, we have that Si is an EC in G. Let Ei = E>0 ∩ Si × Si be the restriction of E>0 to Si, let Gi = (d, Si, Ei, w) be
the corresponding graph, and let Gi = (Gi, S0i , S
R
i , R) be the resulting MDP, where S
0
i = S
0 ∩ Si and SRi = S
R ∩ Si.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let xi > 0 be the total long-run average probability of being in Si, and let ~νi be the expected mean
payoff vector achieved when starting from (anywhere) in component Si:
xi =
∑
s∈Si
x˜s > 0 (3)
~νi =
1
xi
·
∑
(s,t)∈Ei
x˜st · w(s, t) (4)
Since component Si cannot be left, it is reached with probability xi, and thus the expected mean payoff is
∑k
i=1 xi · ~νi ≥ ~ν.
Remark 7. This analysis immediately yields a 2-memory randomized strategy achieving expected mean payoff ~ν. Such a
strategy goes to SCC Si with probability xi, and then plays edge (s, t) with probability x˜st/x˜s. Two memory states are
required to discriminate the two phases. However, such a strategy is not unichain in general, which is what we aim at in this
section.
We design a randomized finite memory unichain strategy that plays edges (s, t) ∈ E>0 with approximate long-run average
frequency x˜st, in order to have mean payoff close to ~ν. We do this in two steps. First, in Sec. A-C2 we design, for each SCC
Si, a randomized memoryless “local strategy” gi which plays edge (s, t) ∈ Ei with long-run average frequency x˜st/xi when
started inside Si. Then, in Sec. A-C3 we combine those gi’s into a global strategy that spends in each Si’s an approximate
long-run fraction of time xi. By using larger amounts of memory, the error in this approximation can be made arbitrarily small.
2) Inside a SCC Si (Strategy gi): For each SCC Si, let gi be the randomized memoryless strategy that plays edge (s, t) ∈ Ei
with s ∈ S0i with probability x˜st/x˜s. Thus, in Gi[gi] edge (s, t) ∈ Ei is visited for a long-run proportion of time x˜st/xi.
Lemma 14. Gi[gi] is recurrent, and for every state s0 ∈ Si,
EGis0,gi [MP] = ~νi
3The size of a non-negative rational number x = p/q with p, q ∈ N relatively prime, and q > 0, is the size of their bit representation, 1+ ⌈log2(p+1)⌉+
⌈log2(q + 1)⌉; cf. [18, Section 3.2].
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G1
play g1
for A · c1 steps
G2
play g2
for A · c2 steps
G3
play g3
for A · c3 steps
play h2 play h3
play h1
Fig. 7: The global strategy gA
In the following lemma, we show the mean payoff obtained by playing according to gi for sufficiently long time is close to
~νi with high probability. The constant L0 in the statement of the lemma does not depend on Si, thus the guarantee holds in
every component Si. The lemma follows from a Hoeffding-style analysis.
Lemma 15. For every δ > 0, there exists L0 = O(
1
δ2 ) ∈ N and constants a, b > 0 s.t., for every component Si, for every
L ≥ L0 and for every state s0 ∈ Si,
PGis0,gi [∃(1 ≤ j ≤ d) · |(MPL − ~νi)[j]| ≥ δ] ≤ G (L, δ) := 2
d · a · e−b·L·δ
2
.
Proof. The lemma follows from an application of Lemma 9 to each component Si separately, and then by aggregating the
constants. More precisely, for each irreducible (and thus unichain) Markov chain Gi[gi], 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Lemma 9 provides Li
(called K0 in the lemma) and constants ai, bi > 0 s.t. for every L ≥ Li and state s0 ∈ Si,
PGis0,gi [∃(1 ≤ j ≤ d) · |(MPL − ~νi)[j]| ≥ δ] ≤ G (L, δ) := 2
d · ai · e
−bi·L·δ
2
.
Just take L0 := max{L1, . . . , Lk}, a := max{a1, . . . , ak}, and b := min{b1, . . . , bk} to satisfy the claim.
3) Across SCCs (The global strategy): We now combine the local strategies gi’s in order to achieve approximate expected
mean payoff ~µ with finite memory. For each SCC Si, let hi be a memoryless strategy ensuring that Si is reached almost surely
from any state in G. The strategy gA is parametrized by a natural number A > 0. Assume that xi is of the form xi = ai/bi,
with ai, bi ∈ N relatively prime, bi > 0, let b = lcm{b1, . . . , bk}, and let ci = b ·xi. Note that ci is a natural number. Intuitively,
gA works in k different stages. In stage i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, gA does the following:
(a) Play hi to reach Si almost surely.
(b) Once in Si, switch to strategy gi for A · ci steps. Then, switch to stage (i mod k) + 1 and go to (a).
A full repetition of stages {1, . . . , k} is called a phase. Intuitively, gA spends a proportion of time xi in Si in the limit, and,
while the game stays in Si, gA plays according to gi. Recall that gi is memoryless.
Remark 8. Strategy gA can be implemented with memory bounded by k · A · b. Notice that in both (a) and (b), gA plays
according to a memoryless strategy, and no memory is needed to distinguish (a) from (b) since it suffices to look at the current
state. Since the size of the binary representation of b is polynomial in W and Q (cf. Lemma 13), strategy gA uses memory
exponential in W and Q, and linear in n and A, where n is the number of states of G.
We show that for any additive error ε > 0, we can play each stage sufficiently long (by increasing the parameter A) s.t. the
probability of deviating from the expected mean payoff ~ν by more than ε in any component is small.
Lemma 16. For any achievable vector ~ν ∈ ExpSolG(s0) and ε > 0, there exists an Aε ∈ N (= O(
1
ε )) s.t., for every A ≥ Aε,
(~ν − ~ε) ∈ ExpSolG(s0, gA).
Proof. We begin by analysing the expected mean payoff of gA over a single phase. Let ~e be the expected mean payoff of a
single phase. We prove that for every ε > 0 there exists A large enough s.t. strategy gA achieves at least expected mean payoff
~ν − ~ε over a single phase.
Let l be an upper bound on the expected length of periods of type (a). That a finite such l exists can be seen as follows.
Formally, let Hs,i be the random variable that returns the first hitting time of the set Si when starting from s ∈ S, that is
the number of steps to reach Si. Let li = maxs∈S E
G
s,hi
[Hs,i] be the worst expected first hitting time of Si from any state
in S when playing according to the memoryless strategy hi (which reaches Si almost surely), and take l =
∑k
i=1 li. By the
definition of hi and standard results about hitting times, the value l is finite.
The length of a period of type (b) at stage i is A · ci, thus the total length of periods of type (b) over a single phase is∑k
i=1A · ci = A · b. Since l (computed above) is the expected length of periods of type (a) over a single phase, the expected
length of a single phase is at most A · b + l.
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Let ~e(b),i be the expected mean payoff of a period of type (b) at stage i. Apply Lemma 15 with δ := ε/8 > 0, and let L0
as given by the lemma. Thus, for every component Si, if we play gi for time L ≥ L0, we have the following lower bound on
~e(b),i:
~e(b),i ≥ (1− G (L, ε/8)) · (~νi − ~ε/8) + G (L, ε/8) · (− ~W )
where W is the largest absolute value of weights in G and ~W = (W, . . . ,W ) ∈ Rd. Moreover, since G (L, ε/8) → 0 as
L→∞, there exists an L∗ ≥ L0 s.t., for every L ≥ L∗, (1−G (L, ε/8)) · (~νi−~ε/8)+G (L, ε/8) · (− ~W ) ≥ ~νi−~ε/4, and thus
~e(b),i ≥ ~νi − ~ε/4 (5)
for every L ≥ L∗. We derive a precise bound for L∗.
(1− G (L, ε/8)) · (~νi − ~ε/8) + G (L, ε/8) · (− ~W ) ≥ ~νi − ~ε/4
if ~νi − ~ε/8− G (L, ε/8) · (~νi − ~ε/8 + ~W ) ≥ ~νi − ~ε/4
if ~ε/8− G (L, ε/8) · (~νi − ~ε/8 + ~W ) ≥ ~0
if ε/8− G (L, ε/8) · (νmaxi − ε/8 +W ) ≥ 0
if G (L, ε/8) ≤
ε
8νmaxi − ε+ 8W
if a · 2d · e−b·L·ε
2/64 ≤
ε
8νmaxi − ε+ 8W
if e−b·L·ε
2/64 ≤
1
a · 2d
·
ε
8νmaxi − ε+ 8W
if − b · L · ε2/64 ≤ ln
(
1
a · 2d
·
ε
8νmaxi − ε+ 8W
)
if L ≥
64
b · ε2
· ln
a · 2d · (8νmaxi − ε+ 8W )
ε
=
=
64
b · ε2
(ln a+ d · ln 2 + ln(8νmaxi − ε+ 8W )− ln ε)
where νmaxi = max{~νi[1], . . . , ~νi[d]} is the largest component of ~νi and G (L, ε/8) = a · 2
d · e−b·L·ε
2/64. Thus, take L∗ :=
64
b·ε2 (ln a+ d · ln 2 + ln(8ν
max
i − ε+ 8W )− ln ε). Notice that L∗ = O(
1
ε ) (since a is exponential in ε).
Therefore, we stay in stage i at least L∗ number of steps, which implies that we should have A ·ci ≥ L∗ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Assumption 1. A ≥ A0 := max{L∗, L0} = O(
1
ε ).
By the definition of L0, A0 is exponential in n (the number of states of G), and polynomial in W and Q.
For a period of type (b) in stage i, the expected total payoff is A · ci ·~e(b),i. The expected total payoff of all periods of type
(a) during a single phase is at least − ~W · l. Thus,
~e ≥
A · c1 · ~e(b),1 + · · ·+A · ck · ~e(b),k − ~W · l
A · b+ l
=
=
x1 · ~e(b),1 + · · ·+ xk · ~e(b),k
1 + lA·b
−
~W · l
A · b + l
First, we choose A large enough s.t. (A)
~W ·l
A·b+l ≤
~ε
2 :
~W · l
A · b+ l
≤
~ε
2
iff
W · l
A · b+ l
≤
ε
2
iff 2 ·W · l ≤ ε · (A · b+ l) = (ε · b) ·A+ ε · l
iff A ≥
l · (2 ·W − ε)
ε · b
Assumption 2. A ≥ A1 :=
l·(2·W−ε)
ε·b = O(
1
ε ).
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When A ≥ A1 we also have (B) ~e(b),i/(1 +
l
A·b ) ≥ ~νi −
~ε
2 , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Indeed,
~e(b),i/
(
1 +
l
A · b
)
≥ ~νi −
~ε
2
if
(
~νi −
~ε
4
)
/
(
1 +
l
A · b
)
≥ ~νi −
~ε
2
iff
(
~νi −
~ε
4
)
·A · b ≥
(
~νi −
~ε
2
)
· (A · b+ l)
iff
~ε
2
· A · b ≥ l ·
(
~νi −
~ε
2
)
iff ∀j
ε
2
·A · b ≥ l ·
(
~νi[j]−
ε
2
)
iff ∀j A ≥
l · (2~νi[j]− ε)
ε · b
if A ≥ A1 =
l · (2 ·W − ε)
ε · b
where the first step follows from the inequality in Eq. 5, and the last step follows from
l·(2·W−ε)
ε·b ≥
l·(2~νi[j]−ε)
ε·b , since, for an
achievable vector ~νi, it must clearly be the case that ~νi[j] ≤W , the largest absolute value of any weight in the game.
Thanks to the two assumptions above, we can derive the following bound on ~e:
~e ≥
x1 · ~e(b),1 + · · ·+ xk · ~e(b),k
1 + lA·b
−
~W · l
A · b+ l
≥
x1 · ~e(b),1 + · · ·+ xk · ~e(b),k
1 + lA·b
−
~ε
2
≥ x1 ·
(
~ν1 −
~ε
2
)
+ · · ·+ xk ·
(
~νk −
~ε
2
)
−
~ε
2
= x1 · ~ν1 + · · ·+ xk · ~νk − ~ε
= ~ν − ~ε
where the second inequality follows from (A), and the third inequality follows from (B). We also use the property that∑k
i=1 xi = 1 and x1 · ~ν1 + · · ·+ xk · ~νk = ~ν.
Now that we have a lower bound on the expected mean payoff over a single phase, we can show that the expected mean
payoff of gA over longer and longer prefixes of an infinite run (thus spanning many phases) converges to ~e, from which the
lemma follows. Notice that the expected mean payoff over m phases is simply m · ~e. Let ~en be the expected mean payoff of
gA in the first n steps. Since in n steps there are an expected number of
⌊
n
A·b+l
⌋
phases of expected length A · b+ l each, we
obtain
~en ≥
⌊
n
A·b+l
⌋
· (A · b+ l) · ~e +
(
n−
⌊
n
A·b+l
⌋
· (A · b+ l)
)
· (− ~W )
n
≥
⌊
n
A·b+l
⌋
· (A · b+ l) · ~e − (A · b+ l) · ~W
n
≥
(n− (A · b+ l)) · ~e− (A · b+ l) · ~W
n
and thus lim infn ~en = ~e. To conclude, take Aε := max{A0, A1} = O(
1
ε ), and the claim is satisfied for any A ≥ Aε.
Lemma 17. For every A ≥ n, G[gA] is unichain.
Proof. Each Gi[gi] is recurrent by Lemma 14. By the definition of gA, G[gA] is obtained by staying in Gi[gi] for a certain
number of steps and then going to Gj [gj ] with j = (i mod k)+ 1 almost surely. If we stay in Gi[gi] for at least n steps, then
with positive probability we can visit every state therein. Thus, G[gA] is unichain.
In the following, for every ε > 0, we denote by gε the strategy gmax{n,Aε}, where Aε is the bound provided by Lemma 16.
Proof of Lemma 1. W.l.o.g. we assume that G reduces to a single end-component S. Let ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0). There exists
~ν∗ ∈ ExpSolG(s0) s.t. ~ν < ~ν
∗. Let ε = 12 ·min
d
i=1(~ν
∗[i]− ~ν[i]) > 0 be the half of the minimal difference between ~ν∗ and ~ν
in any component. Take g := gε. Then, (~ν
∗ − ~ε) ∈ ExpSolG(s0, g) by Lemma 16. By the choice of ε, ~ν < ~ν
∗ − ~ε, and thus
~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0, g). Finally, G[g] is unichain by Lemma 17.
The next lemma will be used later to derive a bound on the number of steps K that strategy gε should be played for in
order to have a mean payoff close to ~ν with high probability.
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Lemma 18. For any ε > 0, there exist K0 ∈ N and constants a, b > 0 s.t., for any K ≥ K0 and state s0,
PGs0,gε/2 [∃(1 ≤ j ≤ d) · |(MPK − ~ν)[j]| ≥ ε] ≤ G (K, ε/2) := 2
d · a · e−b·K·ε
2/4 .
Proof. Fix an error ε > 0, and let ~ν∗ = EGs0,gε/2 [MP] the expected mean payoff when playing according to gε/2. By the choice
of gε/2, ~ν − ε/2 ≤ ~ν
∗ ≤ ~ν. Thus, |(MPK − ~ν)[j]| ≥ ε implies |(MPK − ~ν∗)[j]| ≥ ε/2, and we have
PGs0,gε/2 [∃(1 ≤ j ≤ d) · |(MPK − ~ν)[j]| ≥ ε] ≤ P
G
s0,gε/2
[∃(1 ≤ j ≤ d) · |(MPK − ~ν
∗)[j]| ≥ ε/2] . (6)
Since G[gε/2] is unichain by Lemma 17, we can apply Lemma 9, and, thus, there exist K0 and constants a, b > 0 s.t., for
every state s and K ≥ K0,
PGs,gε/2 [∃(1 ≤ j ≤ d) · |MPK [j]− ~ν
∗[j]| ≥ ε/2] ≤ G (K, ε/2) ,
from which the claim follows by Eq. 6.
APPENDIX B
BEYOND WORST-CASE SYNTHESIS
A. Finite-memory synthesis
In this section, we give full proofs for some statements from Sec. III-A. Fix a game G and worst-case threshold ~µ := ~0.
Proposition 2. Let f be a finite-memory strategy satisfying the worst-case threshold problem. The set of states visited infinitely
often under f is almost surely a winning EC.
Proof. By Proposition 1, the set of states visited infinitely often by f is an EC U almost surely. By contradiction, assume
that U is not winning with some positive probability. Since f is finite-memory, G[f ] is finite. Since U is visited with positive
probability, there exists a reachable bottom strongly connected component B in G[f ] which projected to G is a subset of U .
Since U is not winning, there exists a play in B with mean payoff 6> ~0. By prefix independence of the mean-payoff value
function, there exists a play in G[f ] with mean payoff 6> ~0, contradicting that f is surely winning.
Lemma 3. Let G be a pruned multidimensional mean-payoff MDP, let s0 be a state in a WEC W of G, and let ~ν ∈
ExpSol+G⇂W (s0) with ~ν ≥ ~0 be an expectation achievable by remaining inside W . There exists a randomized finite-memory
strategy h ∈ ∆F(G) s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol
+
G⇂W (s0, h) that also remains inside W .
Remark 9. The statement of the lemma holds even with h a pure finite-memory strategy, by applying Remark 1 in the
construction of strategy gexpε
2
below.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 3. To simplify the notation, we assume w.l.o.g. that the MDP G
reduces to a single WEC W = S. Therefore, G = G ⇂ W . In the following, let
WCSolG(s0, f) = {~µ ∈ R
d | ∀π ∈ Ωfs0 ·MP(π) ≥ ~µ} ,
WCSolG(s0) =
⋃
f∈∆(G)
WCSolG(s0, f) .
Recall that Ωfs0 is the set of plays originating from state s0 which are consistent with strategy f . Since we are in a WEC,
~0 ∈ WCSol+G (s0), and thus WCSolG(s0) contains a vector ~µ > ~0. Moreover, since ~ν ∈ ExpSol
+
G (s0) with ~ν ≥ 0, we can
assume that ~ν ∈ ExpSolG(s0) with ~ν > 0. W.l.o.g. we further assume ~µ < ~ν. We show that, for every δ > 0 and ε > 0, there
exists a randomized finite-memory strategy hcmbδ,ε satisfying the BWC threshold ≥ (~µ −
~δ;~ν − ~ε). The construction of hcmbδ,ε
relies on the existence of the following two strategies:
• Since ~µ is guaranteed in the worst case, by Lemma 2, for every δ > 0 there exists a pure finite-memory strategy fwcδ s.t.
(~µ− ~δ) ∈WCSolG(s, fwcδ ) for every state s in the WEC.
• Similarly, since ~ν is achievable in expectation from state s0, by Lemma 1, for every ε > 0 there exists a randomized
finite-memory strategy gexpε s.t. (~ν − ~ε) ∈ ExpSolG(s, g
exp
ε ) for every state s in the WEC.
The strategy hcmbδ,ε is parameterised by two natural numbers K,L ∈ N, and it alternates between g
exp
ε
2
and fwcδ
2
over periods of
length K and L, respectively:
(a) Play gexpε
2
for K > 0 steps and record in
−−→
Sum ∈ Zd the current sum of the weights since the beginning of the period.
(b) If
−−→
Sum ≥ (~µ− ~δ) ·K , then go to (a). Otherwise, play fwcδ
2
for L > 0 steps, and then go to (a).
Every time a new period starts, the memory of the relevant strategy is reset. It remains to determine the values of the parameters
K and L to reach the desired accuracy. The parameter K , which depends on ε, controls the probability that a period is of
type (a) or (a)+(b), and thus the quality of the approximation of the expectation objective: the larger the K , the higher the
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probability that a period is of type (a), and thus the closer the expectation to ~ν. The parameter L (dependent on K and δ)
controls the length of the recovery period (a)+(b), and thus the larger the L, the closer the worst case to ~µ.
We show that we can always choose L s.t. the worst-case objective is satisfied.
Lemma 19. For every δ, ε > 0 and K ∈ N, there exists L ∈ N s.t. L = O(1δ ) and (~µ−
~δ) ∈ WCSolG(s, hcmbδ,ε ) for every state
s in the EC.
Proof. Let m be the product of the size of the memory of fwcδ
2
and the number of states in G, and let µ∗ > 0 be the smallest
component of ~µ. W.l.o.g. we assume δ < µ∗, since WCSolG(s, h
cmb
δ,ε ) is downward-closed. Below, we derive an expression
for L for the worst-case objective ≥ ~µ − ~δ to be satisfied. Let π be any hcmbδ,ε -consistent play. We decompose π = ρ0ρ1 · · ·
according to periods (a) or (a)+(b). If ρi has type (a), then TP(ρi) ≥ (~µ − ~δ) ·K directly from the definition of periods of
type (a). If ρi has type (a)+(b), then at the end of the (a) part (of length K) the sum of weights is at least −K ·W in every
component. (Recall that W is the largest absolute value of any weight in G.) Moreover, during the following (b) part (of length
L), we have that every time the same memory state of hcmbδ,ε and state of G repeats, the mean payoff is at least ~µ −
~δ
2 , thus
yielding a sum of weights which is at least −m ·W + (L −m) · (µ∗ − δ2 ) in every component. Thus, for every component
0 ≤ j < k, we have
TP(ρi)[j] ≥ −K ·W −m ·W + (L−m) ·
(
µ∗ −
δ
2
)
.
In order to have MP(π) ≥ ~µ−~δ, it suffices to have MP(ρi) ≥ ~µ−~δ for each period i since periods are of uniformly bounded
length, and thus TP(ρi) ≥ (~µ− ~δ) · (K + L), since this length is at most K + L. It is easy to see that the following choice
for L satisfies the constraint above:
L :=
⌈
2 ·K · (W + µ∗ − δ) +m · (2 ·W + 2 · µ∗ − δ)
δ
⌉
(7)
In the following, we consider L as fixed by Eq. 7. We show that one can always choose K s.t. the expectation objective is
satisfied. We crucially use the fact that L is linear in K , and that the probability of periods of type (a)+(b) can be made
negligible for large K .
Lemma 20. For sufficiently small δ, ε > 0, there exists K ∈ N s.t. K = O(1ε ), and (~ν− ~ε) ∈ ExpSolG(s, h
cmb
δ,ε ) for every state
s in the EC.
Proof. Let ~E(K, s) be the expected mean payoff vector in the MDP G when Controller is playing according to hcmbδ,ε , starting
from state s. We prove that there exists a K = O(1ε ) s.t.
~E(K, s) ≥ ~ν − ~ε .
Let ~E(a)(K, s) and ~E(a)+(b)(K, s) be the expected mean payoff of periods of type (a) and (a)+(b), respectively. Let p(K)
be the probability of having a period of type (a)+(b). The expected length of a period is (1 − p(K)) ·K + p(K) · (K + L).
Similarly, the expected total payoff of a period is (1 − p(K)) · ~E(a)(K, s) ·K + p(K) · ~E(a)+(b)(K, s) · (K + L). We thus
obtain the following expression on the right for the expected mean payoff over one period, where the equality to the expected
mean payoff over the entire play is easy to show:
~E(K, s) =
(1− p(K)) · ~E(a)(K, s) ·K + p(K) · ~E(a)+(b)(K, s) · (K + L)
(1− p(K)) ·K + p(K) · (K + L)
By dividing by (1− p(K)) ·K , we obtain the following inequality:
~E(K, s) =
~E(a)(K, s) +
p(K)
1−p(K) ·
~E(a)+(b)(K, s) ·
K+L
K
1 + p(K)1−p(K) ·
K+L
K
≥ ~ν − ~ε
Since ~E(a)+(b)(K, s) ≥ ~µ − ~δ by the choice of L (cf. the proof of Lemma 19), and ~µ − ~δ > ~0 for sufficiently small δ, it
suffices to find K s.t.
~E(a)(K, s)
1 + p(K)1−p(K) ·
K+L
K
≥ ~ν − ~ε (8)
From a qualitative point of view, when taking the limit for K →∞ in Eq. 8,
•
K+L
K tends to a constant, since L is linear in K , and
• p(K) tends to 0.
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Thus, limK→∞ ~E(K, s) = limK→∞ ~E(a)(K, s) ≥ ~ν −
~ε
2 , where the inequality follows from the fact in periods of type (a) we
are playing according to gexpε
2
, which guarantees expectation ≥ ~ν − ~ε2 in the long run. Consequently, for every ε > 0, there
exists a K s.t. ~E(K, s) ≥ ~ν − ~ε, as required.
The rest of the proof shows that K can be taken to be O(1ε ). We proceed by an Hoeffding-style analysis. The following
assumption can be satisfied for sufficiently small δ, ε > 0, since ~µ < ~ν was assumed throughout this section.
Assumption 3. ~ν − ~ε ≥ ~µ− ~δ ≥ ~0.
Lemma 18 provides a constant K0 and an upper bound G
(
K, ε4
)
on the probability that the mean payoff deviates from ~ν
by more than ε2 in any component when playing according to g
exp
ε
2
for every K ≥ K0. Thus, 1− G
(
K, ε4
)
is a lower bound
on the probability that the mean payoff in any component deviates from ~ν by less than ε2 .
Assumption 4. Let K ≥ K0.
We get the following lower bound on the expected mean payoff ~E(a)(K, s) of a period of type (a):
~E(a)(K, s) ≥ (1 − G
(
K,
ε
4
)
) ·
(
~ν −
~ε
2
)
+ G
(
K,
ε
4
)
· ~ν0
where ~ν0 ≥ ~0 is a lower bound on the mean payoff of any period of type (a), Therefore, we obtain the following simpler
bound:
~E(a)(K, s) ≥ (1− G
(
K,
ε
4
)
) ·
(
~ν −
~ε
2
)
(9)
Moreover, we can use Lemma 18 also to provide a bound on p(K), the probability of a period of type (a)+(b). If a period
is of type (a)+(b), then there exists a component 1 ≤ j ≤ d s.t. TPK [j] ≤ 0, and thus MPK [j] ≤ 0. Since the strategy g
exp
ε
2
achieves expectation ≥ ~ν− ~ε2 ≥
~0, we have |(MPK−~ν)[j]| ≥
ε
2 for some 1 ≤ j ≤ d. The latter event happens with probability
at most G
(
K, ~ε4
)
by Lemma 18. We thus obtain the following bound:
p(K) ≤ G
(
K,
ε
4
)
(10)
By using Eq. 9 and 10 in Eq. 8, it suffices to find a K s.t.
(1− G
(
K, ~ε4
)
) · (~ν − ~ε2 )
1 +
G(K, ~ε4 )
1−G(K, ~ε4 )
· K+LK
≥ ~ν − ~ε
Let γ be an upper bound on
G(K, ε4 )
1−G(K, ε4 )
· K+LK . Then, it suffices to show
∀(1 ≤ j ≤ d)
(1− G
(
K, ε4
)
) · (~ν[j]− ε2 )
1 + γ
≥ ~ν[j]− ε
if ∀(1 ≤ j ≤ d) 1− G
(
K,
ε
4
)
≥
(~ν[j]− ε)(1 + γ)
~ν[j]− ε2
if ∀(1 ≤ j ≤ d) 1− G
(
K,
ε
4
)
≥
~ν[j]− ε+ γ · (~ν[j]− ε)
~ν[j]− ε2
if ∀(1 ≤ j ≤ d) G
(
K,
ε
4
)
≤
ε
2 − γ · (~ν[j]− ε)
~ν[j]− ε2
(11)
Let ν∗ = max{~ν[1], . . . , ~ν[d]} be the maximal component of ~ν. We show that with the following value of γ we can satisfy
all objectives.
Assumption 5. γ := 14 ·
ε
ν∗−ε .
We now plug in the value for γ into Eq. 11, to obtain G (K, ε/4) ≤
ε
2−
1
4 ·
ε
ν∗−ε
·(ν∗−ε)
ν∗− ε2
, yielding the following bound on
G (K, ε/4):
G (K, ε/4) ≤
1
2
·
ε
2ν∗ − ε
(12)
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Before solving the inequality above for K , we go back one step discuss the constraint derived from the definition of γ. Recall
that γ should satisfy G(K,ε/4)1−G(K,ε/4) ·
K+L
K ≤ γ. By replacing γ with its definition γ :=
1
4 ·
ε
ν∗−ε in the latter inequality, we obtain
the following inequality:
G
(
K, ε4
)
1− G
(
K, ε4
) · K + L
K
≤
1
4
·
ε
ν∗ − ε
(13)
By the definition, L =
⌈
2·K·(W+µ∗−δ)+m·(2·W+2·µ∗−δ)
δ
⌉
, and thus L ≤
⌈
2·K·(W+µ∗)+m·(2·W+2·µ∗)
δ
⌉
≤ 2·(W+µ
∗)·(K+m)
δ + 1.
Thus, K+LK ≤
K+ 2·(W+µ
∗)·(K+m)
δ +1
K = 1 +
2(W+µ∗)
δ +
1
K ·
2m(W+µ∗)+δ
δ . In particular, for K ≥
2m(W+µ∗)+δ
δ , we have
K+L
K ≤ 2 +
2(W+µ∗)
δ .
Assumption 6. K ≥ K1 := max{K0,
2m(W+µ∗)+δ
δ }.
Thus, for K ≥ K1, it suffices to satisfy the following inequality:
G
(
K, ε4
)
1− G
(
K, ε4
) · (2 + 2(W + µ∗)
δ
)
≤
1
4
·
ε
ν∗ − ε
(14)
We perform the following algebraic manipulations:
G
(
K, ε4
)
1− G
(
K, ε4
) · 2
δ
· (W + µ∗ + δ) ≤
1
4
·
ε
ν∗ − ε
if G
(
K,
ε
4
)
≤
1
8
·
δ
W + µ∗ + δ
·
ε
ν∗ − ε
· (1 − G
(
K,
ε
4
)
)
if G
(
K,
ε
4
)(
1 +
1
8
·
δ
W + µ∗ + δ
·
ε
ν∗ − ε
)
≤
1
8
·
δ
W + µ∗ + δ
·
ε
ν∗ − ε
if G
(
K,
ε
4
)
(8(W + µ∗ + δ)(ν∗ − ε) + δε) ≤ δε
if G
(
K,
ε
4
)
≤
δε
8(W + µ∗ + δ)(ν∗ − ε) + δε
if G
(
K,
ε
4
)
≤
δε
(8µ∗ + 8W + 8δ) · ν∗ − (8µ∗ + 8W + 7δ) · ε
if G
(
K,
ε
4
)
≤
ε
(8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 8) · ν
∗ − (8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 7) · ε
(15)
We now compare the bounds on G
(
K, ε4
)
given by Eq. 12 and 15, and we show that, for sufficiently small ε, the latter bound
implies the former. Therefore, we seek for ε s.t.
ε
(8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 8) · ν
∗ − (8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 7) · ε
≤
1
2
·
ε
2ν∗ − ε
if
(
8µ∗
δ
+
8W
δ
+ 8
)
· ν∗ −
(
8µ∗
δ
+
8W
δ
+ 7
)
· ε ≥ 4 · ν∗ − 2 · ε
if
(
8µ∗
δ
+
8W
δ
+ 4
)
· ν∗ ≥
(
8µ∗
δ
+
8W
δ
+ 5
)
· ε
if ε ≤
8(µ∗ +W ) + 4δ
8(µ∗ +W ) + 5δ
· ν∗
Assumption 7. ε ≤ ε0 :=
8(µ∗+W )+4δ
8(µ∗+W )+5δ · ν
∗.
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Therefore, for sufficiently small ε ≤ ε0 < ν∗ it suffices to solve Eq. 15. Recall that G
(
K, ε4
)
= a · 2d · e−b·K·ε
2/16. Thus,
we seek for K s.t.
a · 2d · e−b·K·ε
2/16 ≤
ε
(8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 8) · ν
∗ − (8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 7) · ε
if e−b·K·ε
2/16 ≤
1
a · 2d
·
ε
(8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 8) · ν
∗ − (8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 7) · ε
if −b ·K · ε2/16 ≤ ln
(
1
a · 2d
·
ε
(8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 8) · ν
∗ − (8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 7) · ε
)
if K ≥
16
b · ε2
· ln
(
a · 2d ·
(8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 8) · ν
∗ − (8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 7) · ε
ε
)
if K ≥
16
b · ε2
· ln
(
a · 2d ·
(8µ
∗
δ +
8W
δ + 8) · ν
∗
ε
)
if K ≥
16
b · ε2
·
(
ln a+ d ln 2 + ln
(
8µ∗
δ
+
8W
δ
+ 8
)
+ ln ν∗ − ln ε
)
=: K2 (16)
The constant K2 is of the form
α
ε2 , with α linear in ε and d (recall that a is exponential in ε), and polynomial in the
characteristics of the Markov chain. Thus, K = O(1ε ).
B. Infinite-memory synthesis
1) Inside an EC: We complete the proof of Lemma 6 by showing the two claims. The first claim relies on Lemma 3.9 in
[19], while the second claim relies on Lemma 18.
Claim 1. There are rational constants a and b with b < 1 s.t., for every i ≥ 1 and for sufficiently large K , pi,K ≤ a · b
K·i.
Note that a and b do not depend neither on K , nor on i.
Proof. Recall that pi,K is, by definition, the probability that the total payoff goes below ~Ni in any component during phase i.
Since at the beginning of phase i the total payoff is TPK·i > 2 · ~Ni by definition, pi,K is upper bounded by the probability
that the total payoff decreases by at least ~Ni in any component:
pi,K ≤ P
G[fK ]
s0
[
∃(K · i ≤ h < K · (i+ 1)) · TPh − TPK·i 6> − ~Ni
]
For any state s in the EC, and payoff threshold N ∈ N, let ps,N,K be the probability that the total payoff goes below −N in
any component when starting from ~0 within at most K steps:
ps,N,K = P
G[fK ]
s [∃(0 ≤ h < K) · ∃(1 ≤ j ≤ d) · TPh[j] ≤ −N ]
Thus, pi,K ≤ mins∈S ps,min ~Ni,K . We prove the claim thanks to the following lemma. (It follows from Lemma 3.9 in [19].
For completeness, we provide a proof below.)
Lemma 21. There exists a rational constant c < 1 and an integer N∗ ≥ 0 s.t., for every N ≥ N∗ and starting state s in
G[fK ] s.t. P
G[fK ]
s
[
MP ≥ ~0
]
= 1,
ps,N,K ≤ 2
d ·
cN
1− c
By Lemma 1 we can assume that when playing according to fexp we obtain a Markov chain G[fexp] which is unichain. Since
fexp has strictly positive expected mean payoff and G[fexp] is unichain, the mean payoff is almost surely strictly positive, and
thus we can apply Lemma 21 to the Markov chain G[fexp] and obtain constants N∗ and c s.t. for every N ≥ N∗, K ≥ 0,
and state s, ps,N,K ≤ 2d
cN
1−c . Let ν
∗ = min1≤j≤d ~ν[j], and let K
∗ be large enough s.t., for any K ≥ K∗, Nmini ≥ N
∗. (For
example, take K∗ = 2N
∗
ν∗ .) Assume we are in any phase i ≥ 1. Since N
min
i ≥ N
∗ by the choice of K∗, by Lemma 21 we
obtain, for everyK ≥ K∗, ps,Nmini ,K ≤ 2
d · c
Nmini
1−c = 2
d · c
ν∗·i·K
2
1−c . Since pi,K ≤ mins∈S ps,min ~Ni,K , we have pi,K ≤ 2
d c
ν∗·i·K
2
1−c .
The claim follows by taking a = 2d/(1− c) and b = c
ν∗
2 , which is < 1 since c is.
Proof of Lemma 21. We first prove the lemma in the unidimensional case. Let T be the set of states from where the total
payoff is almost surely −∞, and let T ∗ be the set of states which can reach T with positive probability. Lemma 3.9 in [19]
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when applied to the Markov chain G[fK ] (in general, it applies to Markov decision processes), guarantees that there exists a
rational constant c < 1 and an integer N∗ ≥ 0 s.t. for every N ≥ N∗
PG[fK ]s [∃i ∈ N · TPi ≤ −N and T
∗ is not visited ] ≤
cN
1− c
Since we assume P
G[fK ]
s [MP ≥ 0] = 1, by Lemma 12 the probability to have a total payoff equal to −∞ is 0, and thus T is
empty. Therefore, the probability on the left above is just P
G[fK ]
s [∃i ∈ N · TPi ≤ −N ], which is the definition of ps,N,K , and
thus
ps,N,K ≤
cN
1− c
Now let d > 1, and, for a component 1 ≤ j ≤ d, let pjs,N,K be the probability that we have a drop by −N in the total
payoff in component j, i.e.,
pjs,N,K = P
G[fK ]
s [∃i ∈ N · TPi[j] ≤ −N ]
By looking at the Markov chain G[fK ] projected to component j, we can apply the result from the first part and obtain that,
for every fixed j, there exist cj < 1 and N
∗
j ≥ 0 s.t., for every N ≥ N
∗
j ,
pjs,N,K ≤
cNj
1− cj
By taking N∗ = max1≤j≤dN
∗
j and letting c be the cj maximizing
cj
1−cj
, we have, for every N ≥ N∗,
pjs,N,K ≤
cN
1− c
By definition, 1−pjs,N,K is the probability that the total payoff never goes below −N in component j, and thus Π
d
j=1(1−p
j
s,N,K)
is a lower bound on the probability that the total payoff never goes below −N in any component. Therefore ps,N,K ≤
1−Πdj=1(1−p
j
s,N,K) ≤ 1−(1−
cN
1−c )
d. By a simple calculation (cf. the proof of Lemma 9), we derive (1− c
N
1−c )
d ≥ 1−2d · c
N
1−c ,
and thus
ps,N,K ≤ 1−
(
1− 2d ·
cN
1− c
)
= 2d ·
cN
1− c
as required.
Claim 2. There exist rational constants a and b with b < 1 s.t., for every i ≥ 0 and sufficiently large K , qi,K ≤ a · bK·(i+1).
Note that a and b do not depend neither on K , nor on i.
Proof. Recall the definition of qi,K = P
G[fK ]
s0
[
TPK·(i+1) 6> 2 · ~Ni+1
]
. By the definition of ~Ni+1 =
~ν(i+1)K
2 ,
qi,K = P
G[fK ]
s0
[
MPK·(i+1) 6> ~ν
]
Let ~ν∗ be the expected mean payoff of fexp, and let δ = min1≤j≤d(~ν
∗[j] − ~ν[j]) > 0. Then, qi,K is upper bounded by the
probability that the mean payoff deviates from its expected value ~ν∗ by more than δ in any component. By Lemma 18, this
is upper bounded by a′2de−b
′(i+1)Kδ2 for sufficiently large (i+ 1)K , and thus for sufficiently large K . Take a = a′ · 2d and
b = e−bδ
2
< 1.
C. Inside a general MDPs
In this section, we prove the correctness of the reduction of the BWC problem to solving system T ′.
Lemma 7. Let G be a pruned multidimensional mean-payoff MDP, let ~ν ≥ ~0, and let s0 ∈ S. There exists a (possibly
infinite-memory) strategy h s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, h), if, and only if, the system T
′ has a non-negative solution.
The following proposition is the analogous of Proposition 3 where we consider MEC (instead of MWEC) and arbitrary
strategies (instead of finite-memory ones). As before, it rests on the assumption that all states of G are reachable from s0.
Proposition 6. Let G be a pruned multidimensional mean-payoff MDP. If there exists a strategy h s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, h),
then there exists a strategy h∗ with the same property, and such that, for every MEC U , the set of states visited infinitely often
by h∗ is a subset of U with positive probability.
The following proposition (and its proof) is analogous to Proposition 4, where MWECs are replaced by MECs.
Proposition 7. If T ′ has a non-negative solution, then there exists a (finite-memory) strategy hˆ s.t.
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1) ~ν ∈ ExpSol+G (s0, hˆ).
2) For every MEC U , there is a probability y∗U > 0 s.t. the set of states visited infinitely often by hˆ is inside U with probability
y∗U .
3) The set of states visited infinitely often by hˆ is almost surely an EC. Consequently,
∑
MEC U y
∗
U = 1.
4) Once inside a MEC U , hˆ achieves expected mean payoff ~νU > ~0.
5)
∑
MEC U y
∗
U · ~νU > ~ν.
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof is similar to finite-memory case in Lemma 4. We sketch here the crucial differences.
For one direction, let h be a strategy s.t. (~0;~ν) ∈ BWCSol+G (s0, h). By Proposition 6, there exists a strategy h
∗ that
additionally visits each MEC infinitely often with positive probability. By the construction in Proposition 4.4 of [9] applied to
strategy h∗, we obtain a solution to system T ′. Equations (A1), (A1’), (A2), (C1), (C1’), and (C2) are shown to be satisfied in
the proof of Proposition 4.4. Eq. (B-bis) is satisfied since, by Proposition 1, h∗ is eventually trapped in an EC almost surely
(not necessarily a WEC). Finally, Eq. (C3-bis) is satisfied: By construction, h∗ visits each MEC infinitely often with positive
probability. For every MWEC U there exist s, t ∈ U s.t. x∗st > 0. Since h
∗ is winning for the worst-case, it achieves an
expected mean payoff > ~0 in U , and thus Eq. (C3-bis) is satisfied.
For the other direction, we use Proposition 7 to obtain strategy hˆ, and then we proceed as in the second part of the proof
of Lemma 4 by replacing MWEC with MEC, and by using Lemma 5 instead of Lemma 3 in the construction of strategies
hU ’s.
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